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SCHELLING AND THE NEW THINKING OF JUDAISM

BY WERNER J. CAHNMAN*

I.

The Jewish community in the German speaking areas of Central Europe during the eighteenth century showed signs of disintegration which must be attributed to the collapse of the Sabbatian movement. The leading scholar of this period, Jonathan Eybeschuetz (1690/95–1764), was accused of Sabbatian inclinations and although he knew how to defend himself publicly against the accusation, the embittered controversy left in its wake an atmosphere of consternation and exhaustion. The Frankist movement, which derived from Sabbatianism and led unambiguously away from traditional Judaism, was carried on after Jakob Frank's death in Offenbach (1791) under scandalous circumstances by his daughter Eva until the remnants of the Frankist enterprise collapsed in the year 1817.¹ In these circumstances, even the pious Rabbi Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler (1741–1800) in neighboring Frankfurt abstained from an open confession of kabbalistic beliefs.² He avoided

¹ Eva Frank passed away suddenly during an investigation by the Governor of Mainz, leaving behind debts in the amount of three million guilders. The Frankists believed in a kabbalistic trinity consisting of the highest cause ("der heilige Uralte"), the God Israel's ("der heilige Koenig") and the female complementation ("Shechina"). The last-named aspect provided an opportunity for sexual orgies. Comp. Heinrich Graetz, "Frank und die Frankisten — eine Sektengeschichte aus der letzten Haelfte des vorigen Jahrhunderts" in *Jahresbericht des Juedisch-theologischen Seminars* (Breslau, 1868), 1–90; comp. further the more extended analytic study of Gershom G. Scholem, "Die Metamorphose des haeretischen Messianismus der Sabbatianer in religioesen Nihilismus im 18. Jahrhundert" in *Judaica*, III, 198–217.

² Markus Horovitz, *Frankfurter Rabbinen — Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Israelitischen Kultusgemeinde in Frankfurt a.M.* (Jerusalem, 1969), 213f.; J.

quoting the *Zohar*, but he privately introduced his favorite students to theoretical and practical Kabbala. He conducted services according to the Sefardic rite and followed the prayerbook of Yizhak Luria. Besides the study of Hebrew and Aramaic he engaged in studies of philosophy and the natural sciences — fields of which he attempted to make use in the pursuit of the theoretical and the practical Kabbala. These tendencies continued also later. Therefore, Gershom Scholem's statement that the kabbalistic tradition in Germany breaks off "rather abruptly" after Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler had passed away (1800)³ is only conditionally correct. It was modified by Scholem himself and stands in need of further modification. It is true that Kabbala in its conventional form was only sporadically continued after 1800 and, at any rate, more secretly than publicly. But one can recognize from an enumeration of the students and the students of the students of Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler and from a review of their activities that the continuation and transformation of the kind of thought which derives from Adler's Yeshiva tends to assume central significance in the unfolding of a "Second Emancipation," by which we mean a movement to be placed alongside and after the first emancipation which emanates from Moses Mendelssohn and the Berlin circle.

To Adler's students belonged Rabbi Mendel Kargau, later in Fuerth, Rabbi Joseph Schnaittach, later in Freudental, Rabbi Moshe Sofer (1762–1839), later in Pressburg (Bratislava), Rabbi Seckel Loeb Wormser, the popular "Baal-Shem of Michelstadt" and Rabbi Abraham Bing (1752–1841), later Chief Rabbi in Wuerzburg (1798–1841) who, in turn, exerted consid-

Unna, *Guardians of our Heritage*, ed. L. Jung (1958), 167–85; *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 12, 284–85.

³ Gershom G. Scholem, "Zur Literatur der letzten Kabbalisten in Deutschland" in *Zwei Welten — Siegfried Moses zum funfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag* (Tel Aviv, 1962), 359–376; "Die letzten Kabbalisten in Deutschland" in *Judaica*, III (Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1973), 218–246; also Gershom G. Scholem, *Kabbalah* (New York, 1974), 85f.

erable influence through his students.⁴ The most remarkable personalities among the students and adherents of Bing were Seligmann Baer Bamberger, the “Wuerzburger Rav” (educated in Fuerth, but Abraham Bing’s assistant and successor), the leader of “Gemeindeorthodoxie” in contradistinction to Samson Raphael Hirsch’s “Trennungsorthodoxie,” Rabbi Nathan Marcus Adler (1803–1890) of the Frankfurt family, later Chief Rabbi of the British Empire and the initiator of Anglo-Orthodoxy, Rabbi Jakob Ettlinger (1798–1871), later in Altona and Mannheim, and Chacham (he refused the title “rabbi”) Isaac Bernays (1792–1849), later in Hamburg, whereby it should be added that Bernays and Ettlinger, again, were the teachers of Samson Raphael Hirsch and Esriel Hildesheimer. Although Abraham Bing never openly adhered to Kabbala, one can see from the book of Berthold Strauss, *Die Rosenbaums of Zell*, published in London in 1962, that kabbalistically tinged piety was widely disseminated among his pupils.⁵ This book has contributed decisively to the revision of the initial opinion of Gershom Scholem that Kabbalism in Germany had come to an end with the death of Nathan Adler. We now know from the publication of Berthold Strauss that Mendel Rosenbaum of Theilheim in Lower Franconia, a descendant of a Chmielnicky refugee of 1648, founded a Yeshiva in Zell near Wuerzburg where he was assisted by Abraham Bing’s student Eliezer Bergmann. Eliezer Bergmann, who became Mendel

⁴ Stefan Loewengart, *Aus der Geschichte meiner Familie — Die Familie Bing — Der Familienname Loewengart* (Jerusalem, Nationalbibliothek, manuscript with literature), 1973; Seligmann Baer Bamberger, *Geschichte der Rabbiner der Stadt und des Bezirkes Wuerzburg* (Wandsbeck, 1905). Seligmann Baer Bamberger, although not a student of Abraham Bing, was connected with the kabbalistic tradition through his brother-in-law, Rabbi Seckel Wormser, District Rabbi in Fulda, who, in turn, was a cousin of Rabbi Seckel Loeb Wormser, the famous “Baal-Shem of Michelstadt.” S. Esh, ed., *The Bamberger Family, the Descendants of Rabbi Seligmann Baer Bamberger, the “Wuerzburger Rav”* (Jerusalem, 1979).

⁵ Berthold Strauss, *The Rosenbaums of Zell — A Study of a Family* (London, 1962).

Rosenbaum's son-in-law, emigrated in 1835 to Palestine. A grandson of Mendel Rosenbaum, Reb Hile Wechsler, published in 1881 a book whose title page has been torn out, but which is signed with the pen-name JASCHAR MILO DAVAR (pointing to Pinchas Moshe of Hoechberg=Hile Wechsler). This book predicts, on the basis of dreams and signs and under the impression of the Stoecker Movement, the demise of German Jewry, and calls for the return to Zion.⁶ One passage in the book runs as follows: "One intends to make us into strangers in these regions where we have lived so long and which are dear to us just because we turn our eyes toward Jerusalem and the promised land." A son of Hile Wechsler, Rabbi Salomon Wechsler, emigrated, as had done Eliezer Bergmann, to Jerusalem, where he joined the Bratzlauer Chassidim. According to the testimony of Rabbi Pinchas Kohn, a number of Kabbalists were found among the rabbis in Franconia by the middle of the nineteenth century. However, what is significant about the students and the students of the students of Abraham Bing is not the subterraneous continuation of the kabbalistic tradition, but the combination of that tradition with national-cultural ideas that came to the fore in the garb of a romantic philosophy. Abraham Bartura, a descendant of Eliezer Bergmann, told me in Jerusalem that Abraham Bing, according to a family tradition, animated several of his students to attend universities, presumably for the purpose of enabling them to effectively confront the spokesmen of the religious-liberal persuasion in Judaism. For instance, Joseph Schwarz of Floss in the Upper Palatinate studied geography; after his emigration to Palestine (1833), he authored a book, *Tevuoth Ha-Arez*, which deals with the

⁶ Jaschar Milo Davar [Comp. Amos 6:13, ed.] (Reb Hile Wechsler), title unknown (Wuerzburg, 5640-1880). For a derivation of the pseudonym, see Scholem in *Zwei Welten*, 367. An investigation according to the principles of the psychoanalysis of Jung is contained in James Kirsch, *The Reluctant Prophet* (Los Angeles, 1974).

geography of the Holy Land.⁷ A son of Abraham Bing, Beer Abraham Bing, published 1820 a book, *Obed und Thuerza oder eine Kunde aus der Vergangenheit, erzaehlt in hebraeischer und deutscher Sprache* (Roedelheim, 1820), a sentimental story from a romantically transformed Israel of antiquity, which would deserve to be rescued from oblivion.⁸ In the preface, Beer Bing speaks about the need to counteract “the decay of our sacred father-language” and to lift the veil from that golden period “when we formed our own government and where our nation was among the participants in power.” That sentence contains germs of cultural as well as political Zionism.

Although the old Kabbala was not disappearing, it nevertheless was pushed into an anonymous existence, so that even a man like Abraham Bing could assert without further qualification that it was not obligatory⁹; yet, in its place ideas emerged which continued the old tradition in a new language. The catalyst of the new trend in Jewish thought was Schelling. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) was then at the height of his creativity. A youthful genius, he received a call to the University of Jena at the age of twenty-two, on the basis of his first philosophical writings. From there he went in

⁷ Comp. Abraham Bartura, *Jissu harim shalom — Mikhtevei Massa' Va-'Aliyah*, 1834–36 (Jerusalem, n.d.) and “Die Heimkehr des Jerusalemiten Eliezer Bergmann,” *Pessach Festschrift der Israelitischen Religionsgemeinschaft Wuerttembergs* (April, 1973), 4–10.

⁸ Beer A. Bing introduced comedy into Hebrew literature as well as a realistic style and a pastoral description, which may have had some influence on Mapu. Around the same time, Salomon Ha-Kohen (1772–1845) published a drama, *Amal-ve-Thuerza* (Roedelheim, 1812), wherein, somewhat farther-reaching than Bing, he propagated a life of moral purity and rural labor. See Chaim Shapira, *Toledot ha-Sifrut ha-Ivrit ha-Hadasha* (History of Modern Hebrew Literature), Chap. 1: “*Sifrut ha-Haskalah be-Merkaz Germania*” (Enlightenment Literature in Central Germany) 1784–1829 (Reprint Massada, Tel Aviv), pp. 534–550.

⁹ Acc. to a memorandum of Chief Rabbi Abraham Bing and a majority decision of the Israelitische Kreissynode in Wuerzburg (1836), reported in *Sulamit*, 8, Vol. 1, 372–381.

1803 to Wuerzburg and in 1806 to Munich, where he taught at the *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, becoming its president. Franz von Baader and Heinrich Jacobi taught in Munich simultaneously with Schelling. After 1826, until he was called to Berlin in 1841, Schelling taught at the University of Munich, which had been transferred there from Landshut, in an interim way also in Erlangen and Stuttgart. Schelling's writings on the philosophy of identity appeared 1801–1806, his writings on the philosophy of liberty 1804–1815. Schelling's most inspired document, the fragment "Die Weltalter," was printed for the first time in 1811 and 1813. The edition of 1814 (or 1815) is considered the most complete elaboration of that piece. The earliest lectures on the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation are from the same time. Schelling lectured about these topics after the opening of the university, but the groundwork for the philosophy of mythology reaches back to the period when the treatise about "Die Gottheiten von Samothrake" had appeared, which was read at the public meeting of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences on October 12, 1815.¹⁰ As can be seen from these data, the usual distinction between the younger and the older Schelling can hardly be maintained. Schelling's philosophy, in the main, was completed in the first decades of the century. To be sure, the programmatic world view contained in his writings was never formulated in a systematic way, but it was precisely that circumstance which contributed to its strength at a time of change. The listeners were fascinated by the element of expectation.

The man who introduced the new language of Schelling in Jewish thinking was Isaac Bernays of Mainz, a pupil of Abraham Bing. Young Bernays came to Munich at the moment when the main features of Schelling's thought had been conceived and were delivered for the first time and his reputation was growing. Bernays, who had studied at the

¹⁰ Comp. Foreword of the editor of Schelling's works (Schelling's son) in the fourth and sixth vols. of Schelling's works in the Schroeter edition.

University of Wuerzburg, was a tutor and secretary in the house of the Bavarian court agents, Jakob and Salomon Hirsch. Jakob Hirsch was raised to the peerage in 1818 under the name Hirsch auf Gereuth.¹¹ The family Hirsch granted Bernays a half year furlough to enable him to listen to the lectures of Schelling and Jacobi in Munich. The rabbinical permission came from Abraham Bing. Nothing is known about Bing's extra-rabbinical reading, but the fact that he delegated his student to Munich permits conclusions. One must assume that the study of Schelling's philosophy and possibly the conclusions which Bernays drew from that philosophy conformed to the thinking of Abraham Bing. Familiarity with Schelling's philosophy is reported about Bing's Frankfurt fellow student, Seckel Loeb Wormser in Michelstadt.¹² At any rate, Schelling's influence on Bernays became a historically effective factor.

The stay in Munich made it possible for the young Bernays to see the manuscripts of the "Philosophie der Mythologie" and the "Philosophie der Offenbarung," which were published more than three decades later from Schelling's literary estate. Schelling's lectures made a deep impression on Bernays, as his son Jakob Bernays later indicated.¹³ Isaac Bernays has formulated his own thoughts in two thin volumes, with the title *Der Bibel'sche Orient — Eine Zeitschrift in zwanglosen Heften* which appeared in 1820 and 1821.¹⁴ Bernays authorship was widely assumed at Bernays' life-time. We do not intend to

¹¹ Joseph Prijs, *Die Familie Hirsch auf Gereuth* (Munich, 1931).

¹² Michael Wormser, *Das Leben und Wirken des in Michelstadt verstorbenen Rabbiners Seckel Loeb Wormser* (Offenbach, 1953), 39. The "Baal-Shem of Michelstadt" was a renowned representative of "practical Kabbala." His advice and help were sought by many poor, ill, depressed and disturbed people, Jews as well as Christians. A fine characterization is found in the paper by Eli Straus, "Eine Ahnentafel unserer Familie" in *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts*, 21, 6. Jahrg., 1963, 52-66.

¹³ Hans Bach, "Bernays und Schelling — Eine unbekannte Tagebuchaufzeichnung," *Zeitschrift fuer Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Vol XXV, Heft 4, 1973, 336-340.

¹⁴ *Der Bibel'sche Orient — Eine Zeitschrift in zwanglosen Heften*, I. und II.

enter here into the controversy as to whether Bernays actually authored or co-authored the *Bibel'sche Orient* or not. Hans Bach, who has investigated the *Zeitschrift* as well as the literature about it most intensively, has arrived at a positive result.¹⁵ Others have expressed doubts. I agree in this regard with Heinrich Graetz who says in a footnote to the eleventh volume of his *History* that Bernays, to be sure, has disowned paternity of the *Bibel'sche Orient*, but that these small volumes "nevertheless project his spirit faithfully."¹⁶

The spirit of the *Bibel'sche Orient* is the spirit of Herder and Schelling. The *Bibel'sche Orient* explicitly refers to Herder's "The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry" (I, 6). The basic idea of Schelling's philosophy, which finds its expression in the *Bibel'sche Orient*, is as follows: God and world cannot be grasped conceptually, but must be recognized as a reality.¹⁷ From this basic deliberation derive consequences of such a

Heft (Munich, E.A. Fleischmann, 1821). The first announcement bears the date of May 20, 1820.

¹⁵ Hans Bach, "Der Bibel'sche Orient und sein Verfasser," *Zeitschrift fuer die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland* (ZGJD), VII. Jahrg. (1937), 14-45. See also by same author, "Isaac Bernays", *Monatsschrift fuer Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums* (MGWJ), 83 (1939), 541-547.

¹⁶ Heinrich Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden, vom Beginn der Mendelsohnschen Zeit (1730) bis in die neueste Zeit*, Vol. 11, Chap. 9, Second Ed. (Leipzig, 1900; first ed. 1870), 399-404.

¹⁷ The earliest lectures of Schelling about the Philosophy of Mythology go back to the time when the fragment "Die Weltalter" was written, that is, to the years 1811-1815, as may be concluded from the Foreword of the Editor to Vols. 4 and 6 of Schelling's *Collected Works*. See *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Saemtliche Werke*, ed. Manfred Schroeter (C.H. Beck, Munich, 1954-1960; First ed. J.G. Cotta, Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856-1961) [Henceforth *Werke*]. I am going to refer chiefly to lectures 1-10 of the "Philosophy of Mythology" (Vol. 6), especially to the grandiose Seventh Lecture, and to the Fragment "Die Weltalter" (Vol. 4, *Schriften zur Philosophie der Freiheit*), 571-720; finally to the "Philosophy of Revelation" (Vol. 6), Pt. I, Ninth Lecture, 176-197; Pt. II, Twenty-Ninth Lecture, 511-543 and to the *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen*. As a rule I am quoting Schroeter, except where the Schroeter volume was not available.

kind that God and world, time and becoming, promise and fulfillment are interwoven in widely extended and splendidly lucid formulations. A conceptual, or negative, philosophy of causal explanations precedes a positive philosophy of comprehensive reality. But the negative, or intellectual, philosophy cannot promote a relationship to existential reality. The God of positive philosophy is prior to time and within time, time's point of departure and time's destination — he is, according to the word emanating from the burning bush, the one “who was and is and will be.” Also, the gods of mythology, who are corporeally conceived, are not a distortion or an allegory, but a reality in their own right which, to be sure, has not advanced to the recognition of the All-and-One. The content of mythology is not to be conceived as a product of thought, but as a necessary process, a historical fact. Peoples come into being *pari passu* with mythology, and along with peoplehood arises polytheism as their mode of expression and languages as their spiritual potentiality. With languages, again, unarticulated existence is elevated to perceptive vision, by means of which and beyond which revelation is carried back to its origin and the cleavage overcome. Revealed religion, like mythology, is concrete and real, not, as one might assume, merely doctrinal. Revelation has its pinnacle in Christ, but is contained already in the Old Testament. The Hebrews are constituted as a people because they differ, if only in a comparative understanding, from other peoples — in reality and literally they are, as the meaning of the word indicates, “transients” (*ivrim*) whose attachment is to the principle of unity. In the seventh lecture of the Philosophy of Mythology, Schelling pleads in a grandiose manner the cause of the unity of the Torah. According to Schelling, *Elohim* means the generally accepted and immediately experienced God who even contains the potentiality of polytheism — *Jehova* is the God who is called by name and recognized as unique.¹⁸ The idea of the becoming

¹⁸ Schelling, “Philosophy of Mythology,” Vol. 6, Seventh Lecture, 146–176.

of the concept of God, who nevertheless represents a unity, is expressed in various passages by Schelling. So, *Elohim* speaks to Abraham and tells him to sacrifice Isaac, while the angel of Jehova (*malach adonai*) hinders him to lay his hand on the boy. When Moses inquires about the name of God, so that he might be enabled to reply to the children of Israel, he receives the answer: "Thus shalt thou say: Jehova, *Elohim* of your fathers, has sent me unto you, this is my name for ever."¹⁹ Schelling's philosophy of time and eternity is grounded on the foundation of philology. One receives the impression that Schelling was a master of the Hebrew language from the word-roots. Thus, he designates eternity as the overcoming of time, because victory and eternity are expressed in one single root, *nezach-nizachon*, in "the meaningful Hebrew language," as he puts it, *El olam* is the God who existed in time and eternity and who is convincing on account of his continued existence (*nizeach*).²⁰ What Schelling recognized in the Torah was mythology along with revelation, partiality along with universality, the beginning along with the goal.

Bernays (or whoever the author of *Bibel'sche Orient* may be) drew Jewish-philosophical consequences from the basic principles of Schelling's theoretical deliberations.²¹ Schelling's argument provided an opportunity for Bernays to confront the Jewish representatives of enlightenment, or, as he called them, "our Friedlaenderianer" (II, 22), with the actuality of history. Rather than contrast an ethically conceived Bible to a superannuated ceremonial law, as the propagators of enlightenment did, Bernays traced the ceremonial law back to its biblical source. At the same time, it was his intention to argue against the conventional overgrowing of the biblical foundation by what he called the "stifening decree" of talmudic interpreta-

¹⁹ Schelling, "Philosophy of Revelation," Vol. 6, Lecture 29, 514; "Die Weltalter," Vol. 4, 278. The school of higher biblical criticism could have learned from Schelling.

²⁰ "Die Weltalter," Vol. 4, 636.

²¹ Literal quotations from the *Bibel'sche Orient* are documented in the text.

tion (II, 54). Looked upon that way, the *Bibel'sche Orient* holds middle ground between congealment and shallowness. As for Herder and Schelling, so was for Bernays the Bible the "Nationalbuch" of an old people (II, 61, 64); the Hebrew language the manifestation of the "Volksgeist," that is, the spiritual existence of the people; ritual law, which regulates conduct, the symbolic expression of the incomprehensible, and cultus the body of Judaism, representing esoteric truth in a way in which it can be grasped (I, 40 II, 40, 41). Particularly instructive is what Bernays has to say about the Hebrew language. The Hebrew language is presented as a genuinely human "remembrance of the oldest world-ideas" whose verbal designations, to be sure, have been transmuted into monotheistic meanings, (I, 25, II, 67). For Bernays, the Bible was, and is, beyond its particular aspect, the testimony to the initial condition of the world, an image of what is eternally valid and an exemplary model of the future of humanity.

Hence, as "the body of the creative word is transformed into the world of externality" (II, 45), the temporal term of eternity is interpreted as unfolding in history and as guided by providence. What was shown in the Bible was "a world-historical document of the dominion of providence and its divine efficacy upon the human mind, demonstrated in an exemplary way in *one* people" (II, 67), and "this people, as long as its law reigns over it" (II, 20), as standing for all humankind. Bernays recognizes that the Lord simultaneously is "our God" (*elohenu*) and the "one God of the whole world" (*echad*). The usual translation: "The Lord, our God, the Lord is One" blurs this coincidence of opposites. While the essence of what is pagan is expressed in the plastic image, the Jewish way is the "symbolic act" (I, 35), whose task it is to concretize ("versinnlichen") the idea (II, 41), not, as in the religion of reason, to spiritualize ("vergeistigen") the concrete.²² Moreover, the author of the *Bibel'sche Orient* meets

²² In another passage (II, 55, 56), Bernays turns against the "fashionably cool waters" of a religion of reason which, as he says, rests "on the dogmatic soil of

in one point with the liberal spirit of the time. He makes the Bible, rather than the Talmud, the focal center of Jewish thought. The Kabbala — by no means condemned to a subterranean existence — is recognized as “the national treatment of Essenic ideas” (II, 49f.) and as a “spiritual organ” as far as its numerical system is concerned, but not accepted as subjective phantasies and arbitrary speculation of theosophers or as an “ascetically inspired twisting of the meaning of the law by Yizhak Luria” (II, 46, 54) — but the spell is broken. The *Bibel'sche Orient*, as also Max Wiener emphasizes,²³ is conceived in Schelling's image. It is an enthusiastic document which embraces everything, yet grasps nothing. However, one must not forget that the *Bibel'sche Orient* is merely a fragment and that elaboration and conclusion are missing. Nevertheless, what remains is a document in which what is specifically Jewish is expressed in the language of the philosophy of the time.

The regional element must not be disregarded at this point.²⁴ Briefly put: while the Mendelssohnian emancipation is a manifestation of the enlightenment, and through the Mendelssohn circle, Friedlaender, Jakobson and the Hamburg Reform Temple, centered in Berlin, Koenigsberg and Hamburg, that is, in the large North German communities, the “second emancipation” is part of the romantic movement and South German in derivation and tendency. Frankfurt, through Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler and his students, is the point of departure.

isolated statements.” In contradistinction, he wishes to present the “historically concrete and lively way in which the acting revelation unfolds.”

²³ Max Wiener, *Juedische Religion im Zeitalter der Emanzipation* (Berlin, 1933), 111–118.

²⁴ I have emphasized in a number of papers that no unified German Jewish Community existed prior to 1871. Instead, one must differentiate between southwest-German, northeast-German and southeast-German (Bohemian-Austrian) Jewries. “A Regional Approach to German Jewish History,” *Jewish Social Studies*, V, 3 (1943), 211–224; “Two Maps on German Jewish History,” *Chicago Jewish Forum*, 2, 1 (Fall, 1943), 58–65; “The Three Regions of German Jewish History,” *Jubilee Vol. dedicated to Curt C. Silbermann* (New York, 1969), 1–14.

Wuerzburg, through Abraham Bing, Mendel Rosenbaum, Seligmann Baer Bamberger and others, is the point of collection, with Bernays included in the Wuerzburg group. Munich, through Schelling and possibly Baader, is the locality from where the philosophical stimulations emanated which introduced Jewish traditionalism into the spiritual world of Europe. The combination of the traditional and the philosophical is first marked by Bernays, later confirmed by Loewengard. At the same time, the tie to village and small town is preserved, as in Michelstadt near Frankfurt (Wormser), Zell near Wuerzburg (Rosenbaum), Freudental near Stuttgart (Schnaittach) and in Muehringen-Hechingen and other places in Wuerttemberg, again through Loewengard. However, combinations and entanglements are associated with that basic theme: Bernays transferred the "second emancipation" to Hamburg, where a vigorous orthodox community maintained itself until the Hitler time — *quasi* as a reaction to the reformist Hamburg Temple. That outcome shows that Bernays cannot have been as ineffective a teacher as is commonly assumed. It ought to be recognized, on the other hand, that Bernays' pupil, Samson Raphael Hirsch, a native of Hamburg, transferred the stimulation he had received from Bernays to Frankfurt in a rationalistic-didactic reformulation which would have been foreign to Bernays. Finally, with Franz Rosenzweig, the movement was reversed, in as much as he returned the Neo-Kantianism of Hermann Cohen to a revised Schellingian existentialism. These interrelationships will be further clarified in the course of our study.

II.

We must now turn our attention to an author who hitherto has remained unknown, Hirsch Maier Loewengard (1813–1886) of Rexingen, Wuerttemberg.²⁵ Loewengard, *Rabbinatsverweser*

²⁵ The documentation of the life of Hirsch Maier Loewengard contains question marks. The best information is contained in A. Taenzer, *Die*

and Rabbi in Berlichingen, Jebenhausen near Goepfingen and Lehrensteinfeld (all in Wuerttemberg), later left the rabbinate, worked, apparently only for a short while, in the editorial offices of the "Israelit" in Mainz as a colleague of Rabbi Markus Lehmann, finally (1859) moved to Basel. He lived there as a private scholar (Dayyan and Shi'ur Rabbi). He died in Basel 1886, at the age of 73. Loewengard was a student of Rabbi Gabriel Adler in Muehringen, then studied at the Yeshiva in Hechingen and at the Universities of Tuebingen, Heidelberg and Munich. Through Gabriel Adler, like Bernays through Bing, Loewengard was connected with the Yeshiva of Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler in Frankfurt. Gabriel Adler, educated in Frankfurt, was the son of the *Landesrabbiner* Marcus Adler in Hannover and a brother of Nathan Marcus Adler of London, Chief Rabbi of the British Empire and founder of Anglo-Orthodoxy.²⁶ Nathan Marcus Adler was a student of

Geschichte der Juden in Jebenhausen und Goepfingen (Stuttgart, 1927), 163–64, and in S. Winniger, *Grosse Juedische Nationalbiographie*, 4. Vol. (Czernowitz, 1925–26), 166–167. Loewengard, who also used the pen names "Salem" and "Juda Leon," was born on March 3, 1813 in Rexingen, Neckarkreis (Wuerttemberg), as son of the peddler Raphael Hirsch Loewengard and Judith née Levi. He passed away on May 12, 1886 in Basel. It is reported that he was buried on the Israelitischer Zentralfriedhof in Hegenheim, Alsace, but neither his tombstone nor entries with the city of Basel or the Jewish Community in Basel could be found. Two sisters were married in Bischheim aux Saum near Strasbourg. Taenzer and Winniger comment on Loewengard's stay in Mainz and Basel, but there is no trace of it in the "Israelit." It is reported that Loewengard has worked in the editorial office of the "Israelit." It is worthy of note, moreover, that Rabbi Markus Lehmann, the editor of the "Israelit," designates himself as a student of Kabbala, although, as Scholem (*Judaica*, III, 218–246) comments, nothing points toward the Kabbala in Lehman's writings.

²⁶ Alexander Elsaesser, *Gabriel Adler, weiland Bezirksrabbiner in Oberdorf, ein Lichtbild* (Esslingen, 1860). Gabriel Adler was Rabbi in Muehringen, 1811–1835, then Rabbi in Oberdorf, 1835–1860. Adler was related to the family of Gabriel Riesser through his wife, who was the daughter of Rabbi Pinchas Katzenellenbogen in Oettingen. Many young students of Judaism assembled around Gabriel Adler in Muehringen when the Yeshiva in Hechingen began to decline after the death of Rabbi Loeb Aach (1820). Among these students were Berthold Auerbach and Hirsch Maier Loewen-

Abraham Bing; the father was a student and near-relative of Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler.²⁷ As the Yeshiva in Hechingen soon declined, numerous students assembled around Gabriel Adler. One must assume that Gabriel Adler transmitted the kabbalistic tradition of the Adler family to Loewengard who acknowledged the fact openly, as may be concluded from his pen-name "Juda Leon." "Juda" stands for Loewengard (the Lion of Juda!) and "Leon" for the Spanish Kabbalist Moses de Leon, who was the author of the *Zohar*, according to Gershom Scholem.²⁸ In his writings, Loewengard quotes, apart from Moses Maimonides, also Moses Nachmanides, one of the small number of Spanish Kabbalists who have contributed remarkably to rabbinic literature. Three publications of Loewengard have been preserved, two under his proper name, one under the name Juda Leon. In these three publications, Loewengard advocates a reform of conventional Judaism, but a reform which continues, not destroys, tradition. Loewengard thus stands for a third solution which is not identical either with orthodoxy or with liberalism. We are going to follow Loewengard's argument through his three publications.

gard, who studied at the same time. My great-grandfather, Julius Levi (Muehringen), was a friend of Berthold Auerbach and likewise a student of Gabriel Adler. About Gabriel Adler's Talmud School, in which he may have cooperated with the Rabbinateverweser David Dispeker in Hechingen, see also the "Historisch-topographische Beschreibung des Rabbinatebezirks Muehringen" by the District Rabbi, Dr. M. Silberstein, 22.12. 1875 (Ms. in *Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv*, Abt. Nr. 1040/4). Scarce information is contained in *Zur Geschichte der Juden in Hechingen* (Nach den Urkunden und Mitteilungen des Gemeindevorstehers Isaac Levi und des Rabbiners Fr. Samuel Mayer dargestellt, no date, Katalog Vol. 1 of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York). The Yeshiva in Hechingen was dissolved 1850, after the sponsoring family Kaulla had moved away.

²⁷ Nathan Marcus Adler, after 1831 Landesrabbiner in Hannover, was called to London, 1845, as Chief Rabbi of the British Empire. The father, Marcus (Mordecai) Adler, was Rabbinateverweser ("Stiftsrabbiner") for the Land Hannover, 1802-1829.

²⁸ Gershom G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York, 1961), 186-204 and *passim*.

The first publication, published in 1841 by the author under the name Juda Leon, bears the title *Beitraege zur Kritik der Reformbestrebungen in der Synagoge* (Contributions to a Critique of the Reform Movement in the Synagogue). It is prefaced by a motto from Lessing: "If Catholic and Protestant insist on Catholic and Protestant, why should only the Jew not be permitted to show the Jew?" An even more significant motto is offered in the text: "Le roi est mort, vive le roi."²⁹ The young author admits in the foreword that he had composed his words "in the first excitement about the nonchalance and distinguished coolness with which some pronounce *en passant* judgment of death over large parts of the Jewish religious system." Loewengard's commentary, as he calls it, is directed against the sermons of Dr. Maier (Stuttgart) and Rabbis Mannheimer (Vienna) and Salomon (Hamburg). Loewengard expresses the opinion that all revealed religions had arrived "at the point of desperation"; yet, contrary to the paganism of antiquity which could "throw itself in the arms of a newly blossomed lively creed," our contemporaries merely "faced an empty abyss." The Jews particularly had progressed in the fifty years since Mendelssohn "from modest doubt to a complete lack of faith and to total indifference." It is Loewengard's thesis that what exists deserves consideration, but that, on the other hand, institutions are subject to change. The old-time rabbis had been in the possession of moral power, that is, of the "confidence" of the community, but had neglected to make concessions to the educated public, while the modern theologians, without enjoying universal confidence, overemphasize "prophetic Judaism" disquieting the conscience without achieving a pacification of reason. The question was now: rupture or accommodation? The educated members of the community should find it possible to show "patience with the traditional shape of religion" without making those less

²⁹ Juda Leon, *Beitraege zur Kritik der Reformbestrebungen in der Synagoge* (Stuttgart, 1841), p. 7.

educated feel insecure on "the dizzying heights" of abstraction. Tolerance needs to be combined with rabbinic scholarship. Loewengard concludes with the comment that he was not the servant of any party in Judaism.

Loewengard is impartial also in his subsequent remarks. Yet, while he blames the "cocooned rabbis" who never had taken notice of "the whistling loom of the time," he is much more outspoken vis-à-vis the newfangled "preachers." The sermons of the reformers, he feels, could neither touch the authority of the Talmud nor replace the belief of redemption in Zion by the expectation of "universal enlightenment." The doctrine of the Messiah was not thought through to its end by those who incessantly talk about it, because the Messiah was supposed to be "king and teacher"; "teacher" alone was not enough. It was not possible to draw a line of division between the Talmud that incorporates "pure tradition" and those parts of it that are less obligatory; nor could one counterpose Bible and Talmud, or "Prophets" and "Law." It was a superficial understanding of the spirit of the prophets to believe that "one could forge weapons against religion itself by availing oneself of the magnificent prophetic lectures against the abuse of the ceremonial aspects of religion for the purpose of a justification by work or in the service of hypocrisy." Prophetic Judaism was not a "partial concept" but the "whole Judaism." Torah derived from Moses and Moses was the greatest prophet. "Freedom of discussion" was necessary, but not "those victory bulletins before the battle had actually started." One could not help asking oneself what the "final goal" of all the radically negative efforts was supposed to be? And what was the lever of change? Was apologetics helpful in the battle for emancipation? "Just try," Loewengard asserts, "and eliminate everything from our religious life and confession that might lend itself to misjudgment — prejudice against us, rather than vanish, would stand out even more glaringly."

The fronts are changed in Loewengard's publication of 1842, *Auch einige Worte ueber das neue Gebetbuch im Hamburger*

Tempel (A few words about the new prayerbook in the Hamburg Temple).³⁰ While Loewengard is a traditionalist in the question of the retention and justification of the ceremonial law, he favors more freedom in reforming the synagogue service, provided such a reform would not violate the spirit of tradition. According to Loewengard, there are three possible areas of reform in Judaism: reform of dogma, of casuistry and cultus. In the area of dogma, changes are excluded; in casuistry, that is in the decision of single legal cases, the question was about the limits of reform; but radical reforms are called for in the cultus. Bernays and Ettlinger, Loewengard believes, had made a mistake in their declaration against the Hamburg Temple, because their condemnation was directed precisely against those efforts of reform which had the greatest justification, namely, those in the area of cultus. One must appreciate, he continues, these two rabbis in their "peculiar ways": Ettlinger should continue with investigations about "willows and watercress" (meaning minutiae rather than essentials), while Bernays was best advised, if "he persisted in his contemplative inclination." He surely was not meant to be a reformer. One could not accuse the Hamburg prayerbook of a "sin against the positive content of the Jewish religion." However, Loewengard argues not so much against Bernays and Ettlinger but against the great mass of orthodox "coreligionists," meaning that he turns "against the veto of inertia, against the organization of a dignified divine service," against the overloading of the service with "too great a quantity of prayers"; he is in favor of the introduction of instrumental music and community singing, provided, however, that what is "characteristic of the synagogue" be preserved and, as he adds, "rather" without the organ and Protestant chorals. The use of the Hebrew language in prayer was to be preserved, but not in the case of a worshipper who does not understand the wording of the prayer. He wishes to shorten

³⁰ Tuebingen, 1842.

prayers and to omit passages which contain hostility against other peoples. However, with all conceded freedom of choice and interpretation, Loewengard turns against the overemphasis on the individualistic point of view that is inherent in the efforts of Reform. For instance, he says, we express in the *Mussaf* prayer the expectation that the whole of Israel, not the isolated worshipper, may be led up in joy into "our land"; the "messianic hopes" of the synagogue remained in force even if the messianic belief, from the point of view of the individual, may be considered "logically untenable." "The right of the individual" had to take second place in "public service," if held against the principle that "the faith of All fortifies the faith." No matter whether one considered the newer religious conditions "progress" or a "misfortune," the fact remained that "the sincere teacher of religion" was no more in a position, as previously, to demand obedience "as something which goes without saying." Just as little, however, should the teacher feel justified "to throw away this plentiful and productive stuff *en bloc*, as if there were no more validity to it." What the "people" mean by religion has "a tough life" and would give "a lot of trouble" to the radicals. On the other hand, faith, as with Maimonides, is not to exclude philosophical justification. It is obvious that Loewengard is a conservative who wants to change only where change serves preservation.

The picture of Loewengard may be complemented by the protocols of the second and third German rabbinical assemblies in Frankfurt a.M. (1845) and Breslau (1846) in which he participated.³¹ The protocols show that Loewengard, not always in agreement with the majority of participants, must be considered an adherent of a reform which preserves tradition. He speaks for the maintenance of the Hebrew language in the

³¹ *Protokolle und Aktenstuecke der zweiten Rabbinerversammlung*, abgehalten in Frankfurt a.M. vom 15. bis 28. Juli 1845 (Frankfurt a.M., 1845), 16, 54, 106, 133, 147. *Protokolle der dritten Versammlung deutscher Rabbiner*, abgehalten zu Breslau vom 13. bis 24. Juli 1846 (Breslau, 1847), 279-285.

service, especially regarding the reading from the Torah, while he is inclined to permit the vernacular regarding reading from the Prophets (*neviim*) and Writings (*ketubim*). Similarly, he is for the idea of the Messiah, but against a political Jewish state; for the admission of the organ in the synagogue service and the abolition of conventional modes of mourning, such as rending the garments, growing of the beard and the like. On the other hand, Loewengard votes against the motion of Wechsler to reduce the period of mourning from seven days to three; against the motion of Hess, to leave mourning habits to the "religious-moral sentiments of the mourners" and against the motion of Holdheim which opposes any kind of new casuistry, with the reason that one had "abolished already enough," meaning more than enough. In addition, he is of the opinion that one should not "initiate" new reforms. Reforms should be considered admissible only "where the cleavage has already entered the consciousness."

With his third publication, *Jehova, nicht Moloch, war der Gott der alten Hebraeer* (Jehova, not Moloch, was the God of the Ancient Hebrews), which was published in 1843 in Berlin, Loewengard makes his entry into the political arena. More importantly this writing is an outstanding source for our knowledge of the powerful influence which Schelling exerted upon his Jewish listeners.

The Moloch story belongs to the history of antisemitism in Germany, especially in Nuernberg. F.W. Ghillany, professor and city librarian in Nuernberg, against whom Loewengard polemicizes, was the author of a book which appeared in Nuernberg in 1842, with the title, *Die Menschenopfer der alten Hebraeer, eine geschichtliche Untersuchung* (The Human Sacrifices of the Ancient Hebrews, a Historical Investigation). The book reads like a prelude to the propaganda of Julius Streicher. Ghillany quotes *verbatim* passages from the books of the Bible, in order to prove that the ancient Hebrews had sacrificed human beings and that Moloch, not Jehova, was the original God of the Hebrews. Toward the end of the book, he

observes that remnants of the sacrificial cult had continued "surrepetitiously" even after the Persians had abolished it. Ghillany alludes to the possibility of the continuation of "human sacrifices on the occasion of the Pessach festival." In the style of later nazistic assertions, he continues: "The accusation which arose among Christians and Mohammedans in consequence of such a possibility, that even the Hebrews who presently are dispersed among the nations, occasionally indulged in human sacrifice, does not belong to the area which I have staked out in writing the present book." Thus Ghillany dispatches the poisoned arrow which in the Hitler period had such a deadly effect all over Germany. The slogan "Franken voran" must be remembered in that context.

Loewengard says in the foreword to his polemical publication that he is speaking out because no Jewish scholar had attempted a refutation of Ghillany's book, possibly because it had not yet aroused the attention of Jewish scholars. Following the Schellingian argument, Loewengard admits that the biblical narration demonstrated that the majority of the people of Israel had adhered to "mythology" and that only a small band had stood for pure monotheism. As examples, he mentions Jephtha, Samson, the golden calf. On the other hand, he indicates that prophets, Talmud and Midrash had combatted the powerful impact of paganism in Judaism, had branded the worship of idols as a crime and elevated the service of the one and only God to a legitimate principle. We will return later to the mythological connection; at this point, it may suffice to refer to Loewengard's admission that even "some features in the biblical-talmudic ceremonial prescriptions were of intrinsically pagan origin" and that a division of the laws of Moses "in those that emanate from the principle of pure monotheism and those which do not rise above the level of paganism," as advocated by "men of progress among Jewish theologians," failed to correspond to the reality of ancient history. Among these "men of progress," to mention but one example, one would have to count S.L. Steinheim who had attacked Isaac

Bernays' "anti-biblical" *Bibel'sche Orient*,³² possibly, but not demonstrably, under the impression gained from reading Ghillany's book. "This abominable piece of writing," says Steinheim about Bernays, "has no other goal but the total negation of the revelation of the living God by fusing and equating the Holy One of Israel with the damnable idols of Canaan." In contradistinction, Loewengard's argument reads like a defense of Bernays and Schelling. Loewengard agrees with Maimonides that "the obligatory power of the ceremonial law must remain untouched by the results of rational research;" on the other hand, he asserts, however, that "even the most attractive motives which may be found regarding this or other ceremonial laws had only homiletic value, no imperative weight." The first-named argument is directed against Spinoza and his adherents and successors, including the "men of progress," the latter argument is directed against Samson Raphael Hirsch's conception of "Israel's duties." One surely must agree with Loewengard that Ghillany's book could hardly have found "a more lenient adversary among the Jews."³³

All the more emphatic is Loewengard's refutation of Ghillany's inflammatory "phantasmagories" in the second part of his publication. Ghillany maintains that Jehova had been imposed on the ancient Hebrews and that in heart and deed they had remained Moloch worshippers. Abraham, Moses, Samuel, David had been admirers of Moloch. To be sure, the "Moloch religion, Moloch constitution and Moloch literature of the ancient Hebrews" had been "totally destroyed by the Jehovistic revolution," yet not that "totally" that they had not been "transmitted" (*fortgepflanzt*) by means of the "thirsting after Christian blood" of the latter-day Jews! We do not have to follow here in detail the low-level arguments of Ghillany and the sharp refutation by Loewengard. Yet, the controversy contains implications which ought to be mentioned. In the final

³² *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, No. 15 v. 9. 4. 1842, p. 220.

³³ Loewengard, *Jehova* etc., 25.

sentences of the second part of his brochure, Loewengard points to the *causa efficiens occulta*, as he calls it, of the "shameful role" to which Dr. Ghillany has condemned scholarship.³⁴ He points to the "arrogance of many learned theologians, of predominantly flat-rationalistic or narrow-minded esthetic inclinations, by means of which they are ashamed of the connection between the Old and New Testaments." Another thought is added to this observation. Loewengard refers to the "higher criticism" of the biblical writings that was already proliferating at his time, from Eichhorn to Hengstenberg, to Ewald, to the "moderately negative" critique of Gesenius and the "immoderately negative" critique of Gramberg.³⁵ In referring to the negative criticism "which does not leave one stone upon the other in the writings of the Old Testament and has an eye only for what is disparate in these books," Loewengard combats the school of Wellhausen *avant la lettre* with an argument which can be compared to the opinions of Samson Raphael Hirsch, Benno Jacob and Franz Rosenzweig at a later time, but which turns more immediately against the demagogic distortion of the criticism by Ghillany.³⁶ Nevertheless, the theologians men-

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

³⁵ The authors quoted by Loewengard are Protestant theologians and orientalist. Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752-1827), Professor of Oriental Languages and Biblical Exegesis in Goettingen, is considered the initiator of biblical criticism. Georg Heinrich August von Ewald (1803-1875), Eichhorn's successor in Goettingen, was the author of a Hebrew grammar and of a critical "History of the People of Israel." Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (1802-1869), Professor of Theology in Basel and Berlin, represents a different opinion about the topic. Karl Peter Wilhelm Gramberg (1797-1830) was the author of a "Critical History of the Religious Ideas of the Old Testament." Heinrich Friedrich Wilhelm Gesenius (1786-1842), Professor of Orientalistic Studies and Old Testament in Halle, known as the author Gesenius-Buhl, "Hebrew and Aramaic Dictionary of the Old Testament," is considered only "moderately" critical by Loewengard. Contrary to Loewengard, Franz Rosenzweig (*Kleinere Schriften*, 135) has recognized Gesenius' achievement, which has not been matched by any Jewish scholar.

³⁶ *Jehova*, 29.

tioned by Loewengard are also meant. The effect which was desired subconsciously, although not always consciously intended by these scholars, was to destroy the unity of the Torah and to replace that unity with a conglomerate of heterogeneous particles. The idea was that a continued historical existence was denied to these fragments and that Judaism was a lost case. As a matter of fact, the real existence of the Torah does not depend on any critical analysis. Critique *per se* is justified. Yet, it remains true that the splintering of the Torah leads to the denial of the right of existence of the Jewish people, which is founded upon the Torah and that the denial has become historically effective, as subsequent events have demonstrated. In that context, Loewengard's conclusion is prophetic in character. As a "lonely Jew" and all "reverence for the heights and depths of German scholarship" notwithstanding, he predicts: "once upon a time, truth will demand a strict accounting from those who fondle a lie and from those who do not resist it as much as they can."

The conclusion, as well as some comments in the first chapter of Loewengard's publication, *Jehova, not Moloch, was the God of the Ancient Hebrews*, point to the core of the double thesis which we wish to present, namely, first, that the influence of the personality and the philosophy of Schelling on the thinking of the spokesmen of the "second emancipation," which may be called a conservative emancipation, cannot be gainsaid, and second, that the thinking of these spokesmen, as well as of Schelling, had emanated from kabbalistic sources.³⁷ The inter-relationship can be documented. We are informed about the personal contact between Schelling and Loewengard through a document which I have discovered in the *Geheimes Hausarchiv* in Munich. King Max II of Bavaria had asked Schelling, his former teacher, about his opinion and recommendation regarding the emancipation of the Jews, when that question had gained actuality in the revolutionary year 1848.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 39-43.

Schelling immediately sent a memorandum to the King, to which he attached a private letter. In the letter, Schelling points out that, in case emancipation should be granted, the Jews most likely would demand a Jewish Consistorium and a Jewish faculty, presumably side by side with the existing Catholic and Protestant theological faculties at Bavarian universities.

“I believe,” he continues, “that both institutions, properly introduced, could only lead to a good end. The main thing seems to be that the Jews should be turned away from the thoughtlessness of their presently practiced religion which, if not checked, can only terminate in unrestrained atheism. I would say that in Bavaria or nearby, people could be found who might be called to a chair at the Faculty of Theology. In my time, numerous candidates for the rabbinate studied in Munich; they even attended lectures by Catholic theologians, for instance, exegetic lectures by Allioli about books of the Old Testament. I had many Jewish listeners in my own lectures, especially in the philosophy of revelation, and there were many good minds (“viele gute Koepfe”) among them. If the occasion should arise, I could name a person who in the meantime has made a name for himself as a writer (Loewengard, Rabbi in Jebenhausen near Goepingen, Wuerttemberg); he might also be useful as a consultant prior to any decisions to be made about a chair. I have seen him here (in Berlin) only two years ago; without the political changes that have occurred, he might have been able to find a position in Prussia that would have been in line with his capability; I will hope that he has preserved himself mentally under the pressure of the miserable conditions in which he has had to make a living.³⁸

One must conclude from that passage that Schelling has had a chance to read Loewengard’s writings and that he has found

³⁸ The memorandum, as well as the letter of Schelling to King Max II, are published in my paper, “Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling und die Judenemanzipation,” *Zeitschrift fuer Bayerische Landesgeschichte*, Vol. 37, Heft 2, 1974, 614–625. Regrettably, the names of the inscribed listeners at Schelling’s lectures are no more to be found in the files of the University of Munich.

himself in agreement with them. It appears that Loewengard has conferred with Schelling in Berlin in 1846, and it is fair to assume that he has asked Schelling to help him in finding a professorship; he did not feel comfortable in the rabbinate. Schelling made an effort to help, but without success. Not even the emancipation legislation was enacted at that time.

One can go a step further and say that Schelling was most attentive to his Jewish students, apart from Loewengard, and to the problem of Jewish-Christian relations in terms of theology as well as to the problem of Jewish existence in the contemporary world. It must be kept in mind at the same time that Schelling was an intense Christian in faith and that he was holding fast to the belief that Judaism had "fulfilled" itself in Christianity. For further elaboration, let us turn to the twenty-ninth lecture of his *Philosophy of Revelation*.³⁹ Here, Schelling finds that "the blood of bulls and of goats" (Hebr. 9, 13) in biblical sacrifice had brought about "only purification," but failed to liberate "man's innermost being, his conscience."⁴⁰ The sacrifices had to be repeated over and over again because they could not do away with "the real reason for the discord of man with God." The repeated sacrifices pointed toward the last great sacrifice which was to abolish paganism and Judaism at the same time. To be sure, Schelling adds that it must not be doubted that the sacrifices of the Old Testament had "real significance" in their time because otherwise "that of which they were paradigms would have lost significance" — the reconciliation through Christ. That passus is accompanied by a lengthy note which covers a whole page and which testifies to the intensive dialogue (*Gespraech*) which took place between Schelling and his Jewish listeners. Schelling says in the note:

"One of my listeners has written to me repeating what he had mentioned verbatim earlier, referring to my statement

³⁹ Schelling, "Philosophy of Revelation," *Werke*, Vol. 6, Lecture 29, 511-543.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 538.

that the relation of man to God in Judaism was external, not personal, and that the external atonement with God had not done away with the discord of man and God; he considers this statement as not in accordance with the Old Testament. Regarding these statements, I would say:

1. The author of the letter cannot ask that I, from my point of view, should think differently about the external, servant-like behavior, than the apostle Paul who must be granted a deeper insight into Judaism than I or he can ever have. Paul speaks about the servant-like spirit of Judaism, e.g. when he says (Rom. 8,15): 'For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption.' Or, Paul admonishes the Galatians (5,1): 'Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.' And what he means by the yoke of bondage, one may understand from what follows. He continues: 'Behold, I, Paul, say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man who is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law.' It is to be concluded that the yoke of bondage is nothing else but the totality of Mosaic law.

2. It is the teaching of the apostles that the atonement whereof the Old Testament speaks is only such that the inner disunion, the discord with God in man's mind, is not abolished thereby and that it follows that the sacrifices must be performed repeatedly. The entire epistle to the Hebrews, which reveals an author with a deep knowledge of Mosaic law, is written in this sense. However, I will admit to my esteemed listener that enough passages occur in the Old Testament which demand voluntary obedience, that is, a love of God. Surely, isolated rays of a higher atonement break through, especially with the prophets or in passages in the prophetic writings. This must be explained from the contradiction which I have shown to exist in the constitution of the Old Testament, namely, the contradiction between what is contained in it independent of revelation and what is revelation itself. Revelation breaks through, primarily in the prophets, only in a veiled way in the law of Moses. Prophetism as a potentiality already was contradictory to the law — it was quasi the

Dionysic element in the Old Testament. The Jew, when he performed the sacrifices which the law demanded of him, followed the same necessity, the same impulse as the pagan who was performing his sacrifices; what distinguished Jews from pagans was what was prophetic in them, that is, the future which was indicated in prophecy.”

Schelling concedes to his Jewish listener that Torah and Prophets, but especially the Prophets, have known the principle of love. But he holds fast to the idea that the “process,” as he calls it, of mythology equally embraces Judaism and paganism and that revelation, although contained in Judaism and not in paganism, breaks through only in the “future,” that is, in Christ. Moreover, Schelling makes a further concession and one which transforms the adversary position into a dialogic encounter.⁴¹ To be sure, the Jews had excluded themselves from the great movement of history because they rejected Christ and one could only wish and pray that “the veil” be removed from their eyes, but he adds that it “certainly would be very wrong to alienate the Jews from their ancestral religion and to give them instead a general, absolutely ahistoric and purely theistic religion. As long as they hold fast to their ancestral religion, they retain a connection with true history, the divinely willed process, which is the true life ... Totally broken away and torn away from that connection, the Jews never again would find another connecting link and they would become in a different and even worse way than what they are now and what so many are in our time who have lost the connection with history, and who, like the Jews, are *extorres* and *exsules*, homeless and banished and never finding rest. However, a general conversion of the Jews to mere theism or to a so-called pure religion of reason is not to be expected.” Schelling contends that the Jews are a people held in reservation (“das vorbehaltene Volk”). The promises that were given to them will not have been in vain. “The day will come,” he says, “when they will be readmitted in the divine economy

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 540f.

from which they are now excluded and almost forgotten.”⁴² It remains a secret, when that day will come, but “in the meantime, the necessary civil rights should not be withheld from them.” Schelling had used a similar argument in favor of the emancipation of the Jews in the memorandum to King Max II. In the quoted words from the “Philosophy of Revelation,” Schelling’s position is even clearer. He appears as a stimulator of a conservative emancipation in Judaism, from a decidedly Christian vantage point, to be sure, but nevertheless in recognition of the continued historical existence of Judaism.

Loewengard’s comments on Schelling in *Jehova, nicht Moloch, war der Gott der alten Hebraeer* must be appreciated in the light of such passages as the one just cited from the twenty-ninth lecture of the Philosophy of Revelation. Loewengard speaks in the first pages of the “Moloch” brochure about the “unmatched” enthusiasm of the listeners for Schelling and about “the field of knowledge” (Wissenschaft) which he has reshaped and recreated.⁴³ He refers to Creuzer’s *Symbolik*⁴⁴ and to Schelling’s concept of the “mythological process,” which he believes carries the student far beyond Creuzer.⁴⁵ However, the Jew stops, if he hears symbolic expression and mythology mentioned in a biblical context. He suspects an impermissible contradiction. According to Loewengard, the novelty of the combination made “an extraordinarily powerful impression on the entire auditorium,” but in addition a tragic impression on the Jewish listeners because they felt as if they had been robbed of the crown jewel of monotheism. Nevertheless, Loewengard concedes to

⁴² *Ibid.*, 543.

⁴³ Loewengard, *Jehova*, 7f.

⁴⁴ Georg Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858), German philologist and anthropologist. His chief work is *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Voelker, besonders der Griechen* (1810–1812).

⁴⁵ Schelling, “Philosophy of Revelation,” *Werke*, Vol. 6, 135–140, about “Das Heidnische in der mosaischen Gesetzgebung”, as well as 535, about the “Inclination toward Idolatry in Israel.”

Schelling's exposition the seductive spell which the mythological process cast over Israel, along with the entire world of antiquity. Israel frequently resorted to apostasy. Neither the "low folk" nor the "class of magnates," only a small group of the faithful had adhered to Jehova in love. Loewengard quotes Judges 11 and 14, Midrash Rabba, Tractate Sanhedrin and other passages which should confirm the thesis of the comprehensive mythological process. "A considerable part of the mosaic-talmudic ceremonial law," according to Loewengard, fails to rise above the level of paganism; neither could the ceremonial law be considered as "a mere staircase on which one might ascend to ordinary moral purposes." Nevertheless, one should emphasize "what remains significant in biblical-talmudical ceremonial matters, for instance, in the celebration of the Shabbat and the holidays and in the interdiction of the eating of unclean animals." With this argumentation, Loewengard intends to grant the pagan character of many biblical religious precepts, yet demonstrates the limits for the applicability of a hypothesis which indiscriminately intermingles biblical Judaism and Canaanite paganism. One might comment here that Loewengard appears to draw the contrasts too sharply. For Schelling, the God that is One, eternal and can be spoken to was present already in the Burning Bush and the experience of Elijah on Horeb. In Schelling's own sight, therefore, one can comprehend mythology and monotheism as having risen simultaneously and without standing in need of the christological fulfillment which Schelling considered as the one and only consequence of his biblical faith.

The concluding paragraphs of the "Jehova book" start with a confession which permits a further clarification of Loewengard's and his friend's relation to the person and thought of Schelling. Here are Loewengard's words: "The old darkness has been stirring mightily in these last years. All evil passions, all superannuated errors, all mean insinuations are awakened to a life of terrible reality and set upon the Jews. Or is the aim only against the Jews? Is this possibly the beginning of a

widely extended historical tragedy?" In view of this "widely extended historical tragedy" which Loewengard sees coming, he accuses both those who are conventionally pious and those who are newfangled reformers of an inadequate comprehension of the truths of Judaism. The synagogue, he maintains, could not possibly occupy a dignified position in the eyes of outsiders as long as the internal confusion in religious matters absorbs the best part of its strength. Loewengard uses the opportunity of a last sad meeting he had with a terminally ill friend, whom he had known since his student years, to point to the significance which the philosophy of Schelling could have for a new orientation of Jewish thinking. Loewengard considers as "unthinkable and inefficient" a middle position between the parties — rather the need was for a bold new initiative. But what is the right path? In what manner should one direct the carriage of the synagogue weighed down, as it was, by an unnecessarily heavy load? One thing was certain to him: one should not "experiment with an organic structure as if it were dead matter." Instead of attempting a "formation from the inside out," one observes that bitter strife has arisen between those who argue about "measure and weight" and those who are ready to race ahead "with an entirely empty carriage." Loewengard interrupts the "melancholy discussion" with his ill friend in order to remind him of the "intellectually enjoyable days of our youthful friendship in Munich and our companionship as listeners to Schelling's lectures." That remark stirs the smouldering ashes to a fire of enthusiasm. The friend replies: "Oh, yes, I would like to hear Schelling once again, at least for one year — and then die." "But," I asked, "could you listen once again with the old undimmed delight to the exposition of the development whereby God, after he had said "yes" must not, following a well-known proverb, say "b," but become "b"? How "b," as the time was fulfilled, turns into "c" — "c" meaning Christ, etc.?" "Why not," replies the friend. "For Christian listeners, the philosophy of revelation may appear disturbing because they are opposed and even

hostile to the dogmatic content of their own religion. For what meets them in a delightful garb in a philosophical lecture and offers itself with winning grace as a mere 'remote possibility,' presents itself to them in the Church as an unfriendly and tyrannical dogma. But to me, who is dogmatically free, these possible thoughts, this truly admirable combination of the facts of history provide an unspeakable enchantment . . . Yes, for one more year I would like to be able to listen to Schelling — then I shall gladly die."

The intensity of this confession indicates that Schelling must have been a master of dialogic communication, or, in other words, of a "narrating philosophy."⁴⁶ By a "narrating philosophy" we mean a philosophy which records and interprets what has actually happened, far away as it may have been, a philosophy which presents, in the words of the dying friend, a "combination of the facts of history." The skeptical attitude of the Jewish listener, who is confronted with the christological turn of Schelling's thoughts, is being overwhelmed, on the other hand, by the boldness of the communicated conception, by the surprising connection between, and joining together of, seemingly far distant historical events, by the fire of indisputable conviction. Schelling speaks to the listeners, as Karl Jaspers puts it, "with the excitement of philosophical ardor, with the will to make understandable, what is rapturous, with a solemn mode of expression, with the dignity of philosophy, with the effects of rhetoric splendor."⁴⁷ Jaspers attaches a negative connotation to this description, as if Schelling had been more a magician than a philosopher. This evaluation does not change the fact that few of the Jewish scholars of his time equaled Schelling in the philosophical analysis of the events recorded in the Bible, in the lucidity of the comprehension of what is meant by time and eternity and

⁴⁶ Schelling postulated a "narrating philosophy" in the foreword to the fragment "Die Weltalter". See below, p. 53, and n. 98.

⁴⁷ Karl Jaspers, *Schelling — Groesse und Verhaengnis* (Munich, 1955), 265.

what is the essence of the religious experience. The Jewish listeners found that they were elevated above themselves, yet they felt that they remained within the bounds of their own being. They experienced an emancipation "from the inside out."

Our deliberations are not ended with that statement of Jaspers and the confirmation of it in the writings of Loewengard. It remains to be demonstrated that what the Jewish students listened to in Schelling's lectures was their own Jewish heritage in philosophical transformation. Schelling appeared to them as a master of the Hebrew language, which had been neglected by the Jews of his generation and, at any rate, as a challenging interpreter of biblical thought. In addition, he was a successor of the Christian Kabbala. We cannot deal extensively here with the stimulations which Schelling had received from the representatives of the Christian Kabbala and with the intellectual cross-currents which connected his philosophy with kabbalistic thought. Suffice it to indicate the following: Schelling was the son of a Protestant minister. He was a student of the famous Tuebingen "Stift," along with Hegel and Hoelderlin. Deliberations and speculations about the imminent spiritual redemption of the world were, no doubt, alive in the pietistic atmosphere of the "Stift." One must give the word here to Schelling himself:

"The more glaringly one describes the lack of peace, the discord, the phenomena which threaten disintegration in our time, the more assuredly can the truly informed see in all these things but the omen of a new creation, of a great and lasting reconstitution which, to be sure, would not be possible without painful labors because the reckless destruction of whatever is rotten, fragile and faulty must precede everything else. Yet, there must be an end to this struggle because no end — and purposeless progress, as imagined by some, is possible. Humanity does not proceed into the infinite; humanity has a goal."⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Schelling's "Philosophy of Revelation," *Werke*, Vol. 6, First Lecture, 3-17.

Lofty expectations of this kind could be disappointed, but not refuted. Schelling was an heir. The chief representative of theosophic ideas in Wuerttemberg Protestantism in the generation preceding Schelling was Friedrich Christian Oetinger; his thinking has influenced Schelling and Hegel.⁴⁹ Oetinger had been in contact with Jewish Kabbalists in Frankfurt a.M. and Halle and he knew through them, as well as by means of other sources, such authors as Jakob Boehme, Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, the author of *Cabbala Denudata*, a Christian commentary on the *Zohar*, and also Yizhak Luria; he was acquainted with the book *Ez Chaim* of Chaim Vital.⁵⁰ Schelling had some inkling, if not more, of those connections. He refers to the Kabbala in various passages in his writings. Schelling

⁴⁹ Ernst Benz, *Die christliche Kabbala — Ein Stiefkind der Theologie* (Zuerich-Stuttgart, 1958) and Gershom G. Scholem, "Die Entstehung der Kabbala von Reuchlin bis zur Gegenwart," *Judaica*, III (Frankfurt, 1973), 247–263. Among newer writers, Scholem mentions Brucker, Knorr von Rosenroth and Molitor, but not Oetinger. To Oetinger refers Rainer Heinze, *Bengel und Oetinger als Vorlaeufer des deutschen Idealismus* (Diss. Muenster, 1969). Heinze emphasizes that Bengel, Oetinger and even Schelling disclaim a system of knowledge and rather rely on the course of history. Only in the end of time, which all three thinkers believe to be near, will knowledge be completed and a true system become possible. One receives information concerning the inclusion of Schelling within such a frame of the history of thought by Wilhelm August Schulze, "Schelling und die Kabbala," *Judaica*, 13 (Zuerich, 1957), 65–99, 143–170, 210–232 and Ernst Benz, *Schellings schwaebische Geistesahnen* (Zuerich, 1960). One does not need to identify with the details of Schulze's and Benz' line of thinking to recognize that Schelling belongs among those influenced by the Christian Kabbala, and to appreciate the fact that his inability to complete the philosophical system which he had promised hangs together with his high expectation of a coming end of time of wisdom and understanding and possibly with his disappointment that it had not come to pass.

⁵⁰ Concerning Oetinger's contact with the Frankfurt Jewish Kabbalist, Koppel Hecht, see below my Note 58. It appears that Oetinger was acquainted with the kabbalistic concepts of *Tsimtsum* and *Shevirath-ha-Kelim*. Heinze 59f. and Benz, *Schellings schwaebische Geistesahnen*, 278. Christian Knorr von Rosenroth's *Cabbala Denudata*, 2 vols., appeared in Sulzbach, 1677 and in Frankfurt a.M., 1684.

asked his father, in letters dated from the years 1802 and 1806, to send him the works of Oetinger, both for himself and for the Catholic philosopher Franz von Baader whom Schelling had met in Munich in the year 1806.⁵¹ Baader was attracted by the mysticism of Jakob Boehme and he stayed in contact with the theosophical author Franz Joseph Molitor in Frankfurt a.M. Apart from Baader, Molitor seems to have been influenced by Schelling himself and by the Jewish Kabbalist, Ephraim Joseph Hirschfeld. Later, he published a *Philosophy of History or Tradition*, which work contained an intensive and sympathizing, though uncritical, description and explanation of Jewish mysticism.⁵² It is noteworthy that Molitor is mentioned and his application supported in the very same letter of Schelling to King Max II of Bavaria which also contains the suggestion of a possible professorship for Loewengard. Schelling says that he considers Molitor's book as important "for the history of philosophy, especially of Christianity." This passus indicates the nature of Schelling's interest in the Kabbala as presumably supportive of Christianity. In contradistinction, Franz von Baader, according to David Baumgardt, belongs to the few German thinkers of the nineteenth century who were ready to recognize in Judaism a religious entity in its own right, not merely a precursor of Christianity.⁵³ Baader was in intimate contact with Schelling until Schelling broke rela-

⁵¹ G.L. Plitt, *Aus Schellings Leben. In Briefen*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1869-70), I, 373; II, 101, 179.

⁵² Franz Joseph Molitor, *Philosophie der Geschichte oder ueber die Tradition*, 4 vols. (Muenster, 1827-1855). In the dedication of the second volume to King Ludwig I of Bavaria, Molitor expresses the expectation that his work should direct "the attention of noble minds to the treasures of Judaism." Comp. Gershom G. Scholem, "Die letzten Kabbalisten in Deutschland," *Judaica*, III, 219. About E.J. Hirschfeld, see Gershom G. Scholem, "Ein verschollener juedischer Mystiker der Aufklaerungszeit," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook VII* (1962), 247-268.

⁵³ David Baumgardt, *Franz von Baader und die philosophische Romantik* (Halle, 1927), 34-37 and *passim*.

tions with him.⁵⁴ It is not out of the question that Baader, besides Schelling, influenced Bernays during his stay in Munich. Baader considers Israel as the contracted image of humanity "and the Hebrew language" as akin to the "original language" of mankind ("Ursprache") — ideas that recur in the *Bibel'sche Orient*.⁵⁵ The line of transmission from the Swabian pietists, especially Oetinger, and also from Boehme and Baader, to Schelling cannot be gainsaid.

The intellectual connections indicating Schelling's acquaintance with the Kabbala, are not less compelling. One concept that is prevalent in kabbalistic thinking is the idea of the "breaking of the vessels" (*Shevirath-ha-Kelim*), meaning that the vessels which contained the splendor of eternity are broken and that the break, or fall, into isolation must be healed.⁵⁶ However, the fall, Schelling asserts, is the means of revelation, because there is no revelation without eclipse, as there is no consciousness without the unconscious, no return without previous departure, no becoming without being.⁵⁷ Now, in the political state, we have "free human beings, but separated from God."⁵⁸ In the way of a counter-image, one may say that

⁵⁴ Baumgardt, 41, 200; Plitt, II, 122, 134, 160f., 251f.

⁵⁵ Baumgardt, 37, 351.

⁵⁶ Gershom G. Scholem's *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York, 1961) 265f.; for the theory of contraction (*Tsimtsum*), see *ibid.*, 260f.; for the trichotomic psychology (*neshamah- nefesh- ruach*), see *ibid.*, 240f. Schelling's knowledge of kabbalistic thinking is in all likelihood mediated by the Christian Kabbala, and is not grounded in his knowledge of rabbinic literature.

⁵⁷ Schelling, "Philosophy of Revelation," *Werke*, Vol. 6, Ninth Lecture, 176f.; "Die Weltalter," 592, 594, 597f.; "Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen," Vol. 4, 324f.; Joseph A. Bracken, *Freiheit und Kausalitaet bei Schelling* (Freiburg and Munich, 1972), 28f.

⁵⁸ Schelling, "Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen" (1810), *Werke*, Vol. 4, 453f. Juergen Habermas, in an analytic and informative paper, draws attention to Schelling's contention that the liberation of man through the state was an illusion because the idea of a perfectly just order could result in nothing else but the worst kind of despotism. The state which attempted to treat spiritual phenomena with physical means was the image of a "fallen humanity." Juergen Habermas, "Dialektischer Idealismus im Uebergang zum Materialis-

God conceals himself in order to become conscious of himself because all consciousness is concentration, collection, bringing together. Many passages in Schelling deal with concentration and expansion, but one must discern between concentration upon oneself, wherefrom derives the freedom of action, and the retreat, or contraction, of God out of the created world (*tsimtsum*) which makes possible the action of man.⁵⁹ *Tsimtsum* means that God “hides himself” or that he “retreats,” whereby, according to the Lurianic Kabbala, the sphere of freedom comes into being.

With Schelling as well as with the Kabbala, the creation of the world and what is in it is a conscious act, not a necessary process, as with Hegel, in whose system reason takes the place of freedom. In God is necessity, to be sure, but only as that which presupposes freedom, “because a being must first exist, so that it can act freely.”⁶⁰

It is significant in the present context, where we deal with the mutuality of influence, to indicate the existence in the Kabbala of a doctrine of the trinity of powers (“Potenzen”), but not of persons, as well as a trichotomic psychology. The trinitarian distinction is between “Highest Crown,” “Wisdom”

mus — Geschichtsphilosophische Folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Contraction Gottes,” in *Theorie und Praxis (Politika)*, Vol. 11, 2. ed. Neuwied, 1967), 108–161. Comp. Schelling, *Philosophical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology*, Vol. 5, 23. Lecture, 716–734. However, although Schelling contrasts state and religion, he nevertheless considers the state to be a precondition of spiritual life, differing in this regard from Marx.

⁵⁹ Schelling, “Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen,” *Werke*, Vol. 4, 321f. Comp. Schelling, Vol. 8, 74. More directly corresponding to the concept of *Tsimtsum* is the passus in “Die Weltalter,” 692, according to which God has the power “to retreat, to return for a while to the state of involution.” *Tsimtsum* refers both to God’s freedom to retreat and to the freedom of man, which becomes possible through God’s contraction. Compare my note 56.

⁶⁰ The principle of freedom comes to the fore at various passages with Schelling, e.g. in “Die Weltalter,” 585–86, 679, 682 and in Lecture 24 of the *Philosophy of Revelation*. About the difference between Hegel and Schelling in the evaluation of the principle of freedom, comp. Ernst Benz, *Schellings schwaebische Geistesahnen*, 282.

and "Understanding." The trichotomic psychology divides mind or soul into *Neshamah* (breath of soul), *Nefesh* (drive of soul) and *Ruach* (spirit of soul). Christian Kabbalists have interpreted these ideas along the line of the Christian doctrine of the holy trinity. A trichotomic psychology is contained in Schelling's "Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen." The trichotomic point of view, which was derived from the Kabbala, was taken over from Boehme by Oetinger and has been transmitted through him to Baader and Schelling.⁶¹ In such manner, Schelling and the Christian Kabbala move away from the concept of unity which is essential in Judaism, which concept, on the other hand, stands in the very center of Schelling's thought. Even Schelling's reply to the Jewish listener can be put to question, if one refers to the following passus from "Die Weltalter": "The New Testament is built on the foundation of the Old and obviously presupposes it. The beginning, the first great points in the systems which are developed into the outermost parts of the New Testament, are to be found only in the Old. But the beginnings are the essential, and whoever is unaware of them can never arrive at the whole."⁶² If the beginnings are the essential, revelation is contained in them. Here we get into the area of the self-contradictions of Schelling, into which we do not intend to enter. Analysts and commentators should not be requested to interpret unambiguously and logical consequence into the enthusiastic thinking

⁶¹ These interrelationships are pointed out by Wilhelm August Schulze, "Schelling und die Kabbala," *Judaica*, 13, 82, 87, 158, especially concerning the teaching of the threefold life of the spirit and the theory of contraction. The Frankfurt Kabbalist Koppel Hecht explained to Oetinger that one could sooner learn kabbalistic thinking from Boehme than from the *Zohar*, as reported by Oetinger in his autobiography. Comp. Friedrich Christian Oetinger, *Selbstbiographie*, ed. Hamberger (1846), 46 and the reference to it in Ernst Benz, *Die christliche Kabbala* and in Gershom G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, 238, 405.

⁶² "Die Weltalter," Schelling, *Werke*, Vol. 4, 647, about "The disregard and neglect of the Old Testament."

of Schelling. As we have seen, the christological interpretation was not accepted by Schelling's Jewish listeners in his own time. But his demand of unity in the process of becoming, which is founded on the words of the Torah, has awakened in the same Jewish listeners the imagination as if it had been spoken from their "inside out."

In view of Schelling's contacts with his Jewish listeners, I cannot agree with Scholem's sweeping thesis that a "deutsch-juedisches Gespræch" (a dialogue between Germans and Jews) has never occurred.⁶³ To be sure, there is ample evidence for the phenomenon of the Jewish "cry into the void," which calls for fraternization and remains without reply. But Schelling provides a counter-example. If one takes as a criterium Scholem's statement that a dialogue requires two participants "who listen to each other, who are ready to recognize the partner as what he is and intends to be and to reply to him," then Schelling's note in the "Philosophy of Revelation" and the following paragraphs in the text must be accepted as contributions to a "Gespræch." To be added are Schelling's comments in his letter to King Max II of Bavaria, wherein the chances for the integration of Jews as Jews — through Consistorium and Theological Faculty — are considered, his efforts in providing an academic position for Loewengard, and finally his friendly chats with the philologist Jacob Bernays, a son of Isaac Bernays, who once had been Schelling's student. The picture is complemented from the Jewish side by Loewengard's report in the "Jehova-not-Moloch" brochure. Nothing is detracted from the dialogue by the fact that Schelling speaks as a Christian and the Jewish partners as Jews. To be sure, Schelling hopes for the ultimate baptism of the Jews, but he does not wish to tear them away from their "ancestral religion" in the meantime. He considers the Hebrew language

⁶³ Gershom G. Scholem, "Wider den Mythos vom deutsch-juedischen Gespræch"; "Noch einmal: das deutsch-juedische Gespræch"; "Juden und Deutsche," *Judaica*, II (Frankfurt a.M., 1970), 7-11, 12-19, 20-46.

as a font of wisdom for Jews and Christians. All in all, the documents which we have point to the fact that nobody can enter into a more meaningful dialogue than the Christian who is a convinced Christian and the Jew who is a conscious Jew.⁶⁴

At this point, a comparison of Loewengard and Bernays is called for. Loewengard differs from Bernays in that he relates to Schelling differently. Bernays takes from Schelling and Herder the emphasis on the sensual, the concrete and the individual, whereby the individual ought to be understood not only in terms of the human personality but also in terms of the collective individual, the group and the nationality. Language is the expression of the collective individual, of peoplehood. Judaism, its universality notwithstanding, is a national religion, the Jewish ritual is the garb in which the meaning of the religious message is symbolically manifested. Loewengard, like Bernays, refers to the Kabbala, but compared with Bernays, he holds to a middle line, philosophically as well as in practical application. Bernays is not politically attached or engaged, while Loewengard, belonging to the generation that comes after Bernays, recognizes more clearly than Bernays the danger that arises from the demagogic distortion of romantic philosophies and turns against them. Also regarding religion, Loewengard is more accessible to some of the aims of liberal reform than Bernays. While Loewengard holds the line on ritual and dogma, as Bernays does, he intends to render the divine services more flexible; he wishes to lighten the load of the "heavy carriage" of conventional religious practice, at least as far as public worship is concerned. Bernays was not ready for concessions precisely in the area of cultus. Loewengard is an adherent of Schelling's philosophy of mythology which includes Judaism in the total history of the peoples of antiquity and retraces the history of humanity to biblical origins; he is, like Bernays, an adversary of the religion of reason, and wishes to preserve what is hallowed by tradition and made popular

⁶⁴ See above, n. 13.

through usage. The difference in the area of language is that Bernays has enhanced Schelling's elevated speech into baroque extravagance while Loewengard returns that speech to an occasionally ironic, even sarcastic, but commonly intelligible idiom. Although Samson Raphael Hirsch, as we shall see, hardly continues along the line of Bernays' philosophy, modern orthodoxy, as inspired by Hirsch, nevertheless arises as a consequence of Bernays' thoughts. Loewengard, on the other hand, who combines in his thinking liberal and conservative elements, must be considered as a precursor of a "third solution."

Loewengard left Germany in 1859 for Basel, Switzerland. He has left no public record there. We do not know whether he terminated his activities in Germany because he was dissatisfied with the sterility of Jewish life, or because he considered the reactionary tendencies in German political thinking as threatening, or because he could find allies neither in the Jewish nor in the German camp. All these motives may have been present. It is certain, however, that Loewengard's writings, hardly ever read, soon were completely forgotten. Neither the liberal nor the orthodox rabbinate could comprehend, let alone appreciate, his reformistic traditionalism. Loewengard's writings met with a similar fate as did the dream-prophecy of Hile Wechsler, although for different reasons. Both aftereffects of the influences which had emanated from the Yeshiva of Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler have died away. Even Bernays is mentioned only occasionally in the literature. But the influences which derive from Schelling, intertwined with those coming from Adler, have remained alive, although they required a reformulation in a changed situation. Two of these reformulations must be mentioned, the one of Samson Raphael Hirsch and the one which is connected with the name of Franz Rosenzweig. In the present context, the difference between these two is that Schelling lives on in Hirsch only in a derived and altered way, while Rosenzweig returns to Schelling in full strength.

Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808–1888), a native of Hamburg and the founder of neo-orthodoxy, was a student of Isaac Bernays as well as of Jakob Ettlinger, both of whom were students of Abraham Bing. In that sense, Samson Raphael Hirsch is connected in a twofold way with the tradition which stems from the Yeshiva of Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler. The same holds true for Hirsch's cofighter, Rabbi Esriel Hildesheimer (1820–1899), the founder of the orthodox Berlin Rabbinical Seminary, who studied Semitic languages at the University of Berlin, 1843–45, and who very likely attended lectures of the aging Schelling. We know of both Abraham Bing and Jakob Ettlinger that they counseled their students to combine the study of Torah and Talmud with secular studies, especially with attendance at universities.⁶⁵ From this combination are derived both the Hildesheimer Seminar as well as Hirsch's

⁶⁵ We are obliged for this important information to *verbatim* transmission. Concerning Ettlinger — to Rabbi Dr. M. Auerbach (Halberstadt and Tel Aviv), and concerning Bing to Abraham Bartura (Jerusalem), a descendant of Eliezer Bergmann. The comment of Abraham Bing, that it was of no use for candidates for the rabbinate, like for candidates of the ministry, "to have regularly attended higher schools and to have mastered the Latin and Greek languages," as reported in H. and S. Bamberger, *Geschichte der Rabbiner der Stadt und des Bezirks Wuerzburg* (Wuerzburg, 1906), 86f., does not stand against Bartura's report. Latin and Greek seemed superfluous, but not philosophy and geography, as in the cases of Bernays and Schwarz. It is also possible that Bing wanted to avoid dependence on conditions imposed by the government, as far as the rabbinical office was concerned. It is certain that Bernays studied at the University of Wuerzburg, with Bing's approval. The position of Ettlinger is reported in Pinchas E. Rosenblueth's paper, "Samson Raphael Hirsch — Sein Denken und Wirken" in: *Das Judentum in der deutschen Umwelt 1800–1850*, ed. Hans Liebeschuetz and Arnold Paucker (Tuebingen, 1977), 203–225, note 27. Concerning Hildesheimer, comp. David Ellenson, "Response by Modern Orthodoxy to Jewish Religious Pluralism: The Case of Esriel Hildesheimer," *Tradition*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1979), 74–89. About the controversy Hirsch-Hildesheimer, on the one hand, and Seligmann Baer Bamberger, on the other hand, comp. Herman Schwab, *The History of Orthodox Jewry in Germany*, transl. by Irene Birnbaum (London, 1950), Chap. 9. Ettlinger as well as Bernays, both students of Abraham Bing, combined talmudic scholarship with a wide knowledge of secular literature.

thesis of *Torah-im-derech-erez*, although Hirsch, in terms of practice, seems to have been satisfied with secular education on the *Mittelschule* level.⁶⁶ Ettlinger's ideas carried further; he advised candidates for the rabbinate to aspire to a doctoral degree. But, university studies or not, Hirsch's attitude has nothing to do with philosophical penetration. On the one hand, he would not be satisfied, as Mendelssohn was — to whom he explicitly refers — with a mere “side-by-side” coexistence of the Torah-true observation of *mizwot* and philosophical humanitarianism.⁶⁷ Humanitarianism should emanate from the study of Jewish moral teachings and the observation of the Commandments of the Torah. On the other hand, Jewish humanitarian teachings based on the Torah and secular knowledge should be taught simultaneously, but without philosophy and Judaism having been united, as they were with Bernays. Hirsch says in the last letter of *The Nineteen Letters on Judaism* that he had written the book to provide teachers the opportunity of becoming true Jews so that they could rear young souls for Judaism.⁶⁸ In doing this, he followed Bernays' example, to start with thorough instruction in the Bible and the transmission of secular knowledge, to be followed by the

⁶⁶ Pinchas E. Rosenblueth, 317. It seems irrelevant at this point that Hirsch spoke about a course of education which combines the study of the Torah with general knowledge only after the formation of the *Separatgemeinde* in Frankfurt a.M. 1853. Earlier or later formulated, Hirsch's educational philosophy was directed toward general rather than scholarly knowledge. Moreover, according to Hirsch, Jewish and secular knowledge should be cultivated simultaneously, which means that they were to remain separate entities, while with Bernays Judaism and philosophy interpenetrate. Hirsch's position is to be found in *Gesammelte Schriften* (Frankfurt a.M., 1925), I, 278f., II, 449f.

⁶⁷ Samson Raphael Hirsch, *Neunzehn Briefe ueber Judentum* (Frankfurt a.M., 1911), 18th Letter, 101–102. I am quoting acc. to the German original, but comp. Samson Raphael Hirsch, ed. Jacob Breuer, *The Nineteen Letters* (Jerusalem and New York, 5729–1969).

⁶⁸ Samson Raphael Hirsch, *Neunzehn Briefe*, 19th Letter, 137. Comp. I. Grunfeld, Introduction to *Choreb* (London, 1962), CXLIV.

study of the Talmud only after the completion of the thirteenth year.⁶⁹ However, Bernays neglected the organizational aspects of instruction. He lacked the intention as well as the capability to popularize the Torah. That is what Heine referred to when he wrote to his friend Moses Moser: "I have heard Bernays preach . . . none of the Jews understand him, he wants nothing and will never play a different role; but he is nevertheless a highly intellectual person."⁷⁰ Hirsch played that different role which Heine had in mind, the role of the founder of neo-orthodoxy, without being a "highly intellectual person."

Hirsch's pragmatic attitude, which differs from Bernays' philosophical orientation, is manifested in several of his writings, especially in the "Nineteen Letters."⁷¹ In the nineteenth letter, Hirsch says the present time requires that we serve the daily practice and that we present Jewish teachings "immediately for life," while the development of scientific principles may come later. In the second letter, he explains, supposedly with reference to Bernays, that one should not

⁶⁹ Hans Bach, *Jacob Bernays — Ein Beitrag zur Emanzipationsgeschichte der Juden und zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Tuebingen, 1974), 22; Isaac Heinemann, "The Relationship between S.R. Hirsch and his Teacher, Isaak Bernays" (Hebr.), *Zion*, 1951, 56; Pinchas E. Rosenblueth, 300.

⁷⁰ *Heinrich Heines Briefwechsel*, Vol. 1, ed. Friedrich Hirt (Mainz, 1950), 103, Brief an Moses Moser of 23.8.1823.

⁷¹ Heinemann's assertion (*Zion*, 1951, pp. 26-27) that Bernays' scholarly interests deviate in content and spirit from the *Bibel'sche Orient* and, consequently, that one could not ascribe to him the authorship of the *Bibel'sche Orient* is erroneous. Moses Mendelson reports in his paper "Etwas ueber des sel. Bernays Synagogalvortraege" (*Orient*, 1849, Nr. 50, 218f.), that Bernays had occupied himself with Talmud, Exegesis and Kabbala, without, however, any further reference to philosophy and that he had lectured "with firmly closed eyes," that is, in total absorption and "with a candor that delighted the expert and aroused fear in the blind orthodox." Bernays' combination of strict ritual, mystic belief and free interpretation had stayed with him throughout life. Hans Bach (ZGJD, 44-45) arrives at the same judgment. Hirsch maintained the ritual, but gave faith and interpretation a didactic turn.

learn the Torah “for the purpose of conducting philological and antiquarian investigations, or to find support and corroboration for antediluvian and geognostic hypotheses, or in the expectation of unveiling supermundane mysteries,” but “as a book given us by God that we learn from it to know ourselves and what we are and should do in our earthly existence.” We will return to the problem, which comes to the fore at this point, of the transformation of what is religious into the moral, of the knowledge of God and his ways into a knowledge of ourselves. Obviously, Rosenblueth’s opinion, that Hirsch had continued along the path mapped out by Bernays, needs to be complemented by the observation that he traveled in a different direction.⁷² The lack of philosophical penetration with Hirsch means more than a turn from theory to practice. It means that he turns away from the Schellingian philosophy of mythology as a stage in the development and a precondition for the coming about of revelation. It had been this comparative science of religion of Schelling which Bernays had adopted into Judaism in the *Bibel’sche Orient* and which encountered a lack of understanding and a resistance both among conventional orthodoxy and rationalistic reform. This general opposition may have prompted Bernays to deny the authorship of the *Bibel’sche Orient* without a concomitant alteration in attitude — at least, none that could be demonstrated. An essential element in the opposition becomes translucent in the accusation of S.L. Steinheim who could see in the thesis of the *Bibel’sche Orient* nothing but “a veritable seduction to a base service of idols.”⁷³ Those who criticized Bernays disregarded what Loewengard had emphasized against Ghillany, namely, that “pure monotheism” had arisen on the ground and soil of paganism while it had outgrown paganism at the same time.

⁷² Pinchas E. Rosenblueth, 300–301.

⁷³ *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, Nr. 38f. v. 17. and 24. 9. 1842, 562–69. Comp. Steinheim at a different note (Note 32) as well as Abraham Geiger’s related critique, quoted by Hans Bach, ZGJD, 30.

Hirsch kept away from complex religious-philosophical deliberations. In a non-committal way, Hirsch's views and approach have some affinity to some aspects of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. He emphasizes repeatedly, especially in his lecture on the occasion of the Schiller celebration of 1859,⁷⁴ the relationship of Judaism and "the morally ennobling spirit of Schiller." In this regard, he agrees with the majority of educated German Jews in the nineteenth century and also with the Russian Jewish intelligentsia in the same period. There is no trace of a romantic inclination, as in Bernays, especially regarding the philosophy of language and the emphasis on nationality. Isaak Heinemann, in his paper on Bernays and Hirsch, arrives at the statement that Judaism for Hirsch, in contradistinction to Bernays, was not an initially oriental phenomenon, not defined in terms of nationality, not subject to historical development, but divinely inspired and oriented toward universalism.⁷⁵ Hirsch combined religious orthodoxy, in the sense of doing one's Jewish duty, with political liberalism. In contradistinction to older representatives of Torah-true Judaism, who had taken a skeptical attitude toward the ideas of the French Revolution and the emancipation, Hirsch welcomed the beginning of a new time in which he believed he could see "the dawn of a reawakening human existence in the human kind."⁷⁶ Hirsch was an individualist; his ideal image of a Jew was the "Jissroelmensch," someone who personally represents Judaism in all his acts. While Bernays wanted to concretize the spirit of Judaism, Hirsch was intent on spiritualizing Israel's national existence and her institutions. Folk and land and what was Orient-like in the Bible were for Hirsch at best stages of development, ultimately obstacles on the eternal way of Judaism. Schelling had been of the opinion (in the seventh lecture of the *Philosophy of Mythology*) that

⁷⁴ Samson Raphael Hirsch, "Worte, gesprochen bei der Schillerfeier 1859," *Ges. Schriften*, Vol. 6 (Frankfurt a.M., 1912), 309-321.

⁷⁵ Heinemann, *Zion* (1951), p. 11.

⁷⁶ *Neunzehn Briefe*, Letter 16, pp. 87, 89.

the very fact that the Hebrews had not "partialized" themselves as a people had become their "particularity." Hirsch liberalizes this conception when he calls the Jewish state of antiquity a mere "means for the fulfillment of Israel's spiritual calling." Israel, he writes, has received the Torah in the desert, without a land, and that nothing but the observation of the divine will could be the basis and purpose of Israel's existence.⁷⁷ In other words, land and state had never been ends in themselves, but means for the fulfillment of the Torah. How much more was this the case in the light of the shining horizon of the awakening of the peoples in the new time, under which, as one may say, the *Golah* had been transmuted into free citizenship.⁷⁸ Now, the Jews are in a position where they can do justice to their task, to disseminate among the peoples the divine teaching which had been entrusted to them, for the redemption of mankind.

The impulse that comes from Schelling and that has been transmitted by Bernays lives on in Hirsch in the idea of the unity of the Torah as an expression of the unity of the divine essence, and also in the literal understanding of the word of the Torah. At first glance, it would seem that the same were true about Hirsch's understanding of symbolism.⁷⁹ Actually, Hirsch does not, as Rosenblueth thinks, go farther in symbolism than Bernays⁸⁰; rather, he deviates from the understanding of the symbolic which is found with Bernays. Symbolics shall not, as defined by Hirsch, "teach rules for the understanding of symbols," translate, as it were, what is symbolic into the language of reason.⁸¹ Rather, what is symbolic is a concrete

⁷⁷ *Neunzehn Briefe*, Letter 8, p. 59; *Ges. Schriften*, III, 503.

⁷⁸ Pinchas E. Rosenblueth, 319; also Max Wiener is of the opinion that Hirsch "theoretically in no way remains behind the notions of radical liberalism" and that nothing in his symbolism carries beyond the moral. Max Wiener, *Juedische Religion im Zeitalter der Emanzipation* (Berlin, 1933), 72, 75.

⁷⁹ *Gesammelte Schriften*, III, 212-447; *Comp. Timeless Torah — Anthology of the Writings of Samson Raphael Hirsch* (New York, 1957), 303-420.

⁸⁰ Pinchas E. Rosenblueth, 311.

⁸¹ *Gesammelte Schriften*, III, 214.

sign for a spiritual reality, which one recognizes in the symbol. So, for Bernays, *cultus* is "the concretization of the idea" of Judaism (I, 35), hence the "*Shema*," the symbol for the unification of the national and the universal, the Torah scroll, which is shown and from which one reads, the symbol of the unity of God and Israel. What is symbolic connects us with the meaning of that which it represents. Hirsch, on the other hand, pursues in symbolics the didactic purpose of deducing a moral end from that which, as he believes, is hard to understand. So, circumcision, instead, as with Schelling, to tame savagery, is taken as a sign for the obligation of the "*Jissroelmensch*" to adhere to the covenant with God. The sprinkling of drops of wine on Seder Eve serves not the defense against the powers of evil, but represents the disengagement of man from sin.⁸² Prayer does not mediate the encounter of man and God, but means that man should judge himself and ascend to the highest degree of moral freedom. The Holy is overlaid by the Moral. Dayan I. Grunfeld is right, to be sure, in emphasizing that Kabbala and mysticism were never considered as separated from Halacha,⁸³ except perhaps in the *Salto Mortale* of Sabbatianism and Frankism, but what is decisive in the present context is that the transmutation of the Religious into the Moral is not in line with Schelling's thinking. One must add that the ecstatic element in the tradition of Judaism, which had been alive and combined with Halacha in the Yeshiva of Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler, in Hirsch's generation had disappeared from consciousness. In that sense, Hirsch was a "prevented mystic," as Scholem points out,⁸⁴ with the addendum that it was the spirit of the time which provided the

⁸² Quoted acc. to *Die Pessach Haggada*, ed. E.D. Goldschmidt (Berlin, 1937), 23.

⁸³ Samson Raphael Hirsch, *Horeb — A Philosophy of Jewish Law and Observances*, transl. and intro. by Dayan I. Grunfeld (London, 1962), Introduction.

⁸⁴ Gershom G. Scholem, *Judaica*, I, "Zur Neuauflage des Stern der Erlöschung" (Frankfurt a.M., 1953), 226-235.

prevention. The demanding God had become a teacher of morals. Now, Torah-true Judaism attempts to penetrate once again to an appreciation of the Holy, to a philosophy of revelation in a Jewish understanding, in the synthesis of Rabbi Abraham Kook. With all that, it remains true that the organizational construction, or the institutionalization, of modern orthodoxy is Hirsch's merit and that his discipleship with Bernays has been historically effective.

Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) belongs to a later generation. He had nothing to do with the problems of the *Bibel'sche Orient* and the applicability to Judaism of the Philosophy of Mythology. On the other hand, Rosenzweig consciously referred to Schelling, even if he did so in a transmutation of Schelling's Christian revelation, meaning revelation as a historical event, to a Jewish revelation, meaning the personal experience of the encounter of God and man. Rosenzweig takes his departure from the "Aelteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,"⁸⁵ which he had discovered and analyzed as authored by Schelling. (The manuscript is from 1796.) He proceeds from this point of departure toward the fragment "Die Weltalter" of 1814, which he considered to be the prototype of a new philosophy, and to Schelling's lectures about "Die Philosophie der Mythologie" and "Die Philosophie der Offenbarung."⁸⁶ These lectures were published from Schelling's literary estate, but their conception goes back to the first decade of the century. The total work of Schelling, which is anticipated in the "Systemprogramm," begins with idealism and ends with an existentialistic realism. In addition, Schelling states in "Die Weltalter" that it is his intention to complete in a dynamic way the static realism contained in the philosophy of Spinoza.⁸⁷ As against the concept of absolute being of Spinoza, Schelling poses the concept of absolute action. God knows no necessity, or determination, because a God who

⁸⁵ Franz Rosenzweig, *Kleinere Schriften* (Berlin, 1957), 230–277.

⁸⁶ Schelling, Vols. 4 and 6 (see above, note 17).

⁸⁷ Schelling, Vol. 4, 716f.

“had” to do something, would cease to be a God. The God whom Schelling has in mind acts in liberty. He reveals himself in the universe which is nothing else but his “swelling heart.” In the “Systemprogramm,” Schelling derives philosophy from poetry and poetry from mythology. In this regard, he recalls Giambattista Vico whom, however, he fails to quote. At the same time, Schelling emphasizes that the beginning must point to the goal. A philosophy turned toward what is “concrete” (“eine sinnlich gewordene Philosophie”) ultimately was bound to create a new religion. The new religion of Schelling, in Rosenzweig’s hands, became a renewed Judaism. Rosenzweig repeatedly refers to Schelling in *The Star of Redemption* as well as in the paper “Das Neue Denken” (The New Thinking), which paper he wishes to be understood as “additional comments” to the *Star of Redemption*.⁸⁸ In a letter to his mother of 15 April, 1918, Rosenzweig says that he sees in Schelling “before everything else” his “patron saint.” The fact that he, Rosenzweig, was the one to discover the “Systemprogramm,” appears to him as an event due to the one “who was destined for it.”⁸⁹ Guided by Schelling, then, Rosenzweig takes the decisive step which leads Jewish thinking in his generation away from idealism.

In the present context, it seems remarkable that Rosenzweig in the letter to his mother declares his agreement with the final result of the philosophy of Hermann Cohen. Cohen is considered an eminent representative of Kantian idealism. Yet, Rosenzweig, in the quoted letter to his mother, refers to his sure “feeling that Cohen’s religious philosophy was no plain consequence of the rest of his system,” but rather “something

⁸⁸ Franz Rosenzweig, *Der Stern der Erlösung* (Frankfurt a.M., 1921); in English, *The Star of Redemption*, transl. William W. Hallo (New York, 1970). “Das Neue Denken,” *Kleinere Schriften*, 373–393. The influence of Schelling’s philosophy on the formation of Rosenzweig’s “New Thinking” is described and explained in the analytic study of Else Freund, *Die Existenzphilosophie Franz Rosenzweigs* (Hamburg, 1959), 12–42.

⁸⁹ Franz Rosenzweig, *Briefe*, ed. Edith Rosenzweig (Berlin, 1935), 299.

like a new phase." Rosenzweig was convinced that Cohen in the work of his old age, *Religion of Reason According to the Sources of Judaism*,⁹⁰ had left behind the Kantianism of the rest of his system. He had postulated the recognition of the one and only God as the central experience in Judaism. He had proceeded from the world of pure thought to the realistic conception of the correlation Man-God. It should be noted that Julius Guttman and Alexander Altmann have expressed doubts about this interpretation of Rosenzweig.⁹¹ Alexander Altmann is of the opinion that religion neither was superordinated to Cohen's three methodic directions of cultural consciousness, logic, ethic and esthetic, nor that these are considered to be basic to religion; rather, religion is seen as merely "affiliated" ("angegliedert") with them by means of the concept of correlation. In a similar vein, Guttman speaks of the "incorporation" ("Eingliederung") of the idea of God into the system of ethics. Rosenzweig admits that Cohen shares this opinion and that nothing was further from his thought than the intention to "dislocate the pillars of the system."⁹² Nevertheless, he maintains that Cohen had discovered, in a breakthrough of experience, "the lost paradise of humanity," the living God, and that he had endeavored to confront man with God, even if only in the way of an appendix to the idealistic system. In paraphrasing Rosenzweig, one can say that in his view that which is essentially existential in Cohen has broken through the methodic precepts of idealism. At any rate, the reference to Cohen as well as to Schelling indicates the two

⁹⁰ Hermann Cohen, *Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums* (Frankfurt a.M., 1929). Franz Rosenzweig, "Einleitung in die Akademieausgabe der juedischen Schriften Hermann Cohens," *Kleinere Schriften*, 331f.

⁹¹ Julius Guttman, *Die Philosophie des Judentums* (Munich, 1933), 354f.; Alexander Altmann, "Hermann Cohens Begriff der Korrelation," *Zwei Welten — Siegfried Moses zum funfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag* (Tel Aviv, 1962), 377-399.

⁹² Franz Rosenzweig, "Hermann Cohens Nachlasswerk," *Kleinere Schriften*, 295.

components of Rosenzweig's thinking, the philosophic and the Jewish, both of which have in common the relation to the words of the Bible. However, the proviso is necessary that Rosenzweig turns to Cohen only at the point where Cohen's philosophical thought flows into the bed of Jewish faith.

Rosenzweig differs from Samson Raphael Hirsch in that he does not combine his belief in the sacredness of the Torah with the assumption of the literalness of revelation.⁹³ He is in agreement with Martin Buber in this regard. Neither does Rosenzweig see in the oral tradition a "parallel stream" to the written tradition, as Hirsch does, but rather a Torah that is "read" as against a Torah that is "written," that is, a dynamic Torah as against a fixed Torah. What connects Rosenzweig with Hirsch, especially with Hirsch's translation of the Bible, is the belief in the unity of the Torah as against the tendency of higher biblical criticism to philologize out of the biblical text the total view of world and creation which is contained in the Torah. Rosenzweig does not admit a contradiction between the cosmological creation of the first chapter of Genesis, which leads toward man, and the anthropological creation of the second chapter, which starts with man. Neither does he believe that a fictitious "Elohists" has composed the Bible interchangeably with an equally undemonstrable "Jahvist." Rosenzweig omits at this point any reference to Schelling whose interpretation of the Hebrew text of the Bible would have made the higher criticism superfluous, if the representatives of higher criticism had known and appreciated Schelling. In the "Philosophie der Offenbarung," Schelling points out that what is meant with *Elohim* is the immediate content of consciousness, what is meant with *Jehova* or *Jahve*, however, is the God that is recognized as the true God and called by name.⁹⁴ The *Elohim* of Creation, to whom Schelling concedes a polytheistic

⁹³ Rosenzweig's letter to Jakob Rosenheim, *Briefe*, 584; *Kleinere Schriften*, 128f.

⁹⁴ Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung," II, 29. Lecture, 514f.

plural, is called by his name *Jehova* whereby unity in plurality is postulated. However, Rosenzweig refers to Schelling's essay "Die Weltalter." In analogy to the "Philosophie der Offenbarung," Schelling contrasts in "Die Weltalter" creation ("Schoepfung") as a subconscious "bringing forth in the beginning," to making ("Machen") as a conscious act in which speech is indicated.⁹⁵ The Lord speaks to Moses, the "spoken word of God" pervades the Bible.⁹⁶ In speech, that is, in encounter, Cohen's correlation Man-God and Buber's I-Thou relationship are expressed, while none of these are present in initial creation.⁹⁷ In other words, we are confronted in speech with a sequence of events, not with a separation in thought. In a formal way, Schelling, as well as Rosenzweig, are following biblical precedent in that they tie interpretation to the meaning of words and to their roots. In words, meanings are contained which are revealed not by means of logic, but through philology.

Schelling puts the following guiding sentences at the beginning of the fragment "Die Weltalter": "We know the past, we recognize the present, we divine the future. What we know is narrated, what we recognize is described, what we divine is prophesied."⁹⁸ It was Schelling's intention to narrate, that is, to render as a story "the beginnings of life" and thereby to understand the present as well as to assay the direction which the present may take. It should be observed at this point that narration points toward mythology because "mythos" in Greek means narration — *vera narratio*, according to Vico — in the sense of a legend which carries us back to the events of the beginning and which illuminates from there the problems with

⁹⁵ Schelling, Vol. 4., "Die Weltalter," 688f., 707f.

⁹⁶ Schelling, Vol. 3., "Philosophie der Kunst" (1802), 503.

⁹⁷ Martin Buber, *Ich und Du* (Leipzig, 1923), esp. 25ff. The baseword I-Thou, in contradistinction to the isolated I, is manifested in the life of the child to whom consciousness of Self is brought from the outside. The human relation, shown in the child, mirrors the relation Man-God.

⁹⁸ Schelling, Vol. 4., "Die Weltalter," 571.

which we are confronted. Schelling's intention remained unfulfilled. Schelling imagined "Die Weltalter" to be "some kind of preparation for the objective descriptive science which was to come" because he did not believe that his own time was ready for the task.⁹⁹ Rosenzweig continued and complemented Schelling's theme in his own way in the second part of the *Star of Redemption*. "God spoke" is the fulfillment. "God created" is the beginning.¹⁰⁰ Rosenzweig explains that the initial words which cannot be heard will become audible as real words in living speech. "Real speech confronts us in the place of speech prior to speech." When Schelling predicts that all future philosophy will be "narrating," he intends to indicate, as Rosenzweig comments in a letter to Rudolf Ehrenberg, "the autobiographical confession" which implies an act of speech and an expected reply, that is, a dialogic encounter.¹⁰¹ In a narrating philosophy — and consequently in a narrating sociology — we wish to know how everything "really" has come to pass, how events present themselves in time and place, not how that which has occurred is being organized in a system of concepts, either logically or dialectically. A "philosophy of experience" must start when a negative philosophy with its thought constructs grinds to a halt.¹⁰² Accordingly, Judaism is a fact, Christianity an event, and none of these is exhausted in a construction of thought. Conceptual thinking, in Schelling's terms "negative philosophy," is necessary as a precondition, but does not reach up to existential being and to action which is realized in the state of being; and

⁹⁹ Schelling, *Werke*, Vol. 8, 206.

¹⁰⁰ *Der Stern der Erloesung*, 139–142, 143–144, 185, 301 *et passim*.

¹⁰¹ Franz Rosenzweig, *Briefe* (Letter of 28. 5. 1917), 208. Paul Tillich emphasizes that Schelling has discovered "the category of encounter long before the contemporary Jewish and Christian philosophers of encounter." Paul Tillich, "Schelling und die Anfaenge des existentiellen Protestes," *Zeitschrift fuer philosophische Forschung* (Vol. IX, 1955), 197–208.

¹⁰² "Das Neue Denken," *Kleinere Schriften*, 373–399, esp. 379, 383, 386–87, 392.

being and action are accessible only to *post festum* recognition. Consequently, thought and faith are two sides of the one and the same thing, in Schelling's terms, an "identity"; however, it should be added that thought is over-arched by faith. Rosenzweig replaced Schelling's twofold division of thought and faith with a threefold division of thought, faith and faithful thought, as in a Hegelian sequence of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Yet, the priority of being before thinking is preserved.¹⁰³ The result is a "philosophizing theology," as Buber has emphasized in a paper on Rosenzweig which also refers to Schelling.¹⁰⁴ In a comparative historical view, one can say that Schelling takes his departure from the Kabbala while Rosenzweig, by means of his encounter with Buber, is led on to Chassidism. Chassidism, to be sure, is a narrating theology. What is told by the chassidic Rebbes and about the Rebbes is designed to concretize the Holy and to guide devotion to the deeds of the beginning.

Rosenzweig has reintroduced Schelling into Jewish thinking. As a student of the historian Meinecke, he has done this from a liberal and Hegelian point of departure, from where he turned into an existentialist and traditionalist mode of expression. He has translated the rhapsodic language of the *Siddur* (daily prayerbook) in a hymnic philosophy of a Schellingian cast. One does not know what would have been, if Rosenzweig's premature death and the destruction of the Jewish community in Germany had not rendered the reintroduction into a

¹⁰³ The development from the twofold thinking of Schelling to the threefold model of Rosenzweig is analyzed in Else Freund, *Die Existenzphilosophie Franz Rosenzweigs* (Hamburg, 1959), 73-79.

¹⁰⁴ Martin Buber, "Franz Rosenzweig" in *Hinweise* (Zuerich, 1952), 244-251. Buber's paper is from 1930. Buber mentions Schelling's fragment, "Die Weltalter," as a precondition for Rosenzweig's conception of a new direction in Judaism, as contained in the paper "Das Neue Denken," *Kleinere Schriften*, 373-409. Buber has lectured on Jakob Boehme prior to 1900, as Hans Kohn, *Martin Buber — Sein Werk und seine Zeit* (Koeln, 1961), 23, reports, but he gained acquaintance with Schelling very probably much later. Rosenzweig's paper about "Das aelteste Systemprogramm" was written in 1914.

conclusion. But what once began, lives on. To be sure, Rosenzweig's philosophy, which to him was a perfected whole, cannot be the last word for posterity. Similarly, Hirsch's achievement as an organizer stands in need of revision. Indeed, Schelling's own thought requires a comment. Schelling was near to the sources of religious inspiration and the religious experience of reality. We have traveled far from there. We cannot share Schelling's motivation nor can we speak his language, but we can permit ourselves to be guided by his faith and by the way he gave expression to it. We can listen where experience is lacking. It is here that the present contribution finds its place. Our task is the redefinition of Jewish experience. If one contemplates at the end of our investigation both interpenetrating lines, the one from Nathan Ha-Kohen Adler, his students and the students of his students and their being influenced by Schelling and the one leading from Schelling across the generations to Rosenzweig, one is driven to the conclusion that the "new thinking" has not yet caught on, that the "second emancipation" has not been finished, that the "third solution," which would be traditionalistic and reformistic at the same time, has not been found. To formulate a faithful philosophy of Judaism, which might unite in a new combination the elements which are available, remains a task for us and for those who come after us.

* It is with deep regret that the Academy learned about the passing of Dr. W. J. Cahnman, a well-known sociologist and historian. In addition to his *Sociology and History* (1964) and *How Cities Grew* (1963) he also wrote on Jewish sociology. For a number of years Dr. Cahnman was active in the Conference on Jewish Social Studies. Since 1961 he served as Professor of Sociology at Rutgers University, New Jersey. The Academy expresses its heartfelt sorrow to Mrs. Cahnman and family.